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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, I attempt a taxonomy of the extant accounting literature on
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topics. With regard to the taxonomy, I suggest three broad categories of disclosure research in accounting. The
first category, which I dub “association-based disclosure”, is work that studies the effect of exogenous
disclosure on the cumulative change or disruption in investors’ individual actions, primarily through the
behavior of asset equilibrium prices and trading volume. The second category, which I dub “discretionary-
based disclosure”, is work that examines how managers and/or firms exercise discretion with regard to the
disclosure of information about which they may have knowledge. The third category, which I dub “efficiency-
based disclosure”, is work that discusses which disclosure arrangements are preferred in the absence of prior
knowledge of the information, that is, preferred unconditionally. Then, in the final section of the paper, I
recommend information asymmetry reduction as one potential starting point for a comprehensive theory of
disclosure. That is, I recommend information asymmetry reduction as a vehicle to integrate the efficiency of
disclosure choice, the incentives to disclose, and the endogeneity of the capital market process as it involves
the interactions among individual and diverse investors.
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Abstract 
In this paper I attempt a t axonomy of the ext ant accounting literature 
on disclosure and suggest as categories : "association-based disclosure," 
work that studies the effects of disclosure on asset equilibrium prices 
and trading volume; "discretionary-based disclosure," work that exam-
ines managers' discretion in the disclosure of information about which 
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prior knowledge of t he information. In addition, in t he final section of the 
paper, I discuss information asymmetry reduction as a starting point for 
a comprehensive theory of disclosure. 
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1 Introduction 
This document results from an assignment from the editors of the Journal of Ac-
counting and Economics ( JAE) to survey the ext ant literature on disclosure and 
write a paper that could be titled appropriately 'Models of the Role of Disclosure 
in Capital Markets." The motivation for this assignment, I presume, is that over 
the past two decades disclosure research in accounting has burgeoned from a hand-
ful of papers on the topic to a substantial, and well-recognized , body of work. In 
addition, the JAE has been at the forefront of promoting economics-based research 
in accounting, and many papers commonly cited in the disclosure literature can be 
traced back to it. Finally, while some might debate where disclosure falls as a topic 
in the pantheon of all economics-based research, arguably, its role in accounting is 
central. Economics-based models of disclosure establish a link between financial re-
porting and the economic consequences of that activ ity. W ithout such a link, research 
in financial account ing is open t o the charge that it studies bookkeeping rules and 
opinion promulgations , but in t he absence of any economic motivation. 
All this having been said, executing a task of this nature is less straightforward 
than it appears. Using the a ssigned title as a resource, one might suggest surveying 
comprehensively models that were employed to discuss disclosure in the context of 
capital markets, which, in addition, seem t o have gained some prominence in the 
accounting literature (this, after a ll, being an assignment from an accounting jour-
nal). There are two considerations, however, that militate against a comprehensive 
survey: one practical, the other personal. The practical issue is that t here is no com-
prehensive, or unifying, theory of disclosure, or at least none that I felt comfortable 
identifying as such. In the disclosure literat ure, t here is no centra l paradigm, no 
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single compelling notion that gives rise to all subsequent research, no well-integrated 
''theory," however one interprets that term. Indeed, in its current composition the 
disclosure literature could probably best be characterized as an eclectic commingling 
of highly idiosyncratic (and highly stylized), economics-based models , each of which 
attempts to examine some small piece of the overall disclosure puzzle. Eclecticism is 
exacerbated by t he fact that disclosure, as a t opic, spans three literatures, accounting, 
finance, and economics, and thus inevitably takes on features of those literatures . 
Acknowledging that a comprehensive theory of disclosure is a worthwhile goal, the 
objective of this paper is more modest. As a small, preliminary step toward a com-
prehensive theory, in this document first I consider the full panoply of t heory-based, 
disclosure-related research in accounting and attempt a taxonomy of the literature: 
that is, a categorization of the various disclosure models into well-integrated top-
ics. Then, in the final section of the paper, I recommend one starting point for a 
comprehensive theory. 
With regard to the taxonomy, I suggest t hree broad categories of disclosure re-
search in accounting. The first category of research is work whose primary concern is 
how exogenous disclosure is associated with, or related to, the change or disruption 
in the activities of investors who compete in ca pit al m a rket sett ings as individua l, 
welfare-maximizing agents. I dub this research "association-based disclosure." T he 
distinguishing feature of work in this category is that it studies the effects of exoge-
nous disclosure on the aggregate or cumulative change in investors' actions, primarily 
through the behavior of asset equilibrium prices and trading volume. T he second cate-
gory is work that examines how managers and/or firms exercise discretion with regard 
t o the disclosure of information about which they may have knowledge. I dub this 
research "discretionary-based disclosure." The distinguishing feature of work in this 
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category is that it treats disclosure as end ogenous by considering managers' and/or 
firms' incentives to disclose information known to them ; typically this is done in the 
context of a capital market sett ing in which the market is characterized as (simply) a 
single, representative consumer of disclosed information. The t hird category is work 
that discusses which disclosure arrangements are preferred in the absence of prior 
knowledge of the information, that is , ex ante. I dub this research "efficiency-based 
disclosure." The distingu ishing feature of work in this category is that it examines un-
conditional disclosure choices; typically this is done in the context of a capital market 
setting in which the actions of individual, welfare-maximizing agents are endogenous . 
As with any taxonomy, t here is an element of discretion in the categorization of some 
papers; I make no claim that my choice is definit ive. 
In this paper, I devote an essay to each category of research in my t axonomy. 
That is, the first essay concerns association-based disclosure resea rch, the second ex -
amines discret ionary-based d isclosure research, and the third reviews efficiency-based 
disclosure research. This sequencing of topics has advantages and d isadvantages. The 
main advantage is pedagogy. For example , association-based disclosure is discussed 
first because it is perhaps the most straightforward t opic: it studies relations between 
disclosure and capital market phenomena under the assumption t hat the incentives 
and/ or efficiency of disclosure arrangements are fixed or exogenous. D iscretionary-
based disclosure then introduces the incent ives for disclosure activity (but typically in 
the a bsence of ex ante considerations). Finally, efficiency-based disclosure examines 
unconditional disclosure choice. The main disadvantage of discussing associat ion-
based disclosure first is t hat it requires t hat I discuss how disclosure affects capital 
market phenomena without first offering a rationale for why disclosure exists in the 
first place (e.g. , efficiency-based disclosure) . Suffice it to say t hat each of the three 
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essays is a self-contained discussion a nd there is no harm in reading t he essays out of 
my suggested order. 
In each essay I at tempt to document the historical evolut ion of the topic, examine 
the role of maintained assumptions, and briefly rev iew the overall strengths and 
weaknesses of individual contributions . In addition , in each survey I att empt to 
illustrate t he analysis underlying indiv idual models t hrough a device that I refer 
t o as a "modeling vignette." As a pedagogical device, m odeling vignettes have t hree 
goals . First, t hey represent a n at tempt at d ist illing a complex analysis into its central 
feature, while a t the same time being sufficiently robust to sust ain t hat feature . 
Second, they represent a n attempt a t offering a series of fully integrated examples 
in which a reader can t race t he evolution of a t opic with the minimal amount of 
modeling d islocation. (If the ultimat e goal is a comprehensive theory of disclosure, 
then perhaps the penultimate goal is a series of fully integrated modeling v ignettes.) 
Fina lly, I am of t he conviction that one cannot appreciat e fully a paper's contribut ion 
without "getting one's hands dirty," which is to say actually working through simple 
examples as an exercise. Consequently, my intent in offering these vignet tes is to 
suggest a series of exercises that an interested reader can work through, in the same 
fashion that t extbooks offer problems at the end of each chapter. 
It should go without saying, but I will state it anyway, that a truly comprehensive 
theory of d isclosure would integrate simulta neously into its analysis all three elements 
of my taxonomy. That is, a comprehensive theory would recognize appropriately the 
roles of efficiency, incentives, and t he endogeneity of the market process as it involves 
the interactions among individual, and diverse, welfare-m aximizing investor agents. 
But t his is a cha llenge for future research, and my goal here is limited to laying out 
what I regard as t he building b locks of a comprehensive t heory (in sections 2-4) and 
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recommending one starting point for a comprehensive theory (in section 5) . 
The personal issue that militates against a comprehensive survey is t hat I have 
some reservat ions about this t y pe of assignment . At best, a survey is a poor substi-
tute for reading the original source documents ; at worst, it is a bland and uninspired 
regurgit ation of the lit erature. To assist a reader interested in comprehensively sur-
veying t he lit erature, throughout this document I sprinkle footnote references to a 
large (but I make no claim exhaustive) list of disclosure-related research in the litera-
tures of accounting, finance, and economics .1 In lieu of a comprehensive survey, I offer 
a personal account, or memoire, of work in which I have participated and continue 
t o have a keen interest . I make no apology for this. I believe that a reader profits 
most from the personal reflections and commentary of someone who has pa rticipated 
in the evolut ion of a research pa radigm. I leave it to others t o write about research 
in which t hey are keenly interested. 
With regard t o the last point, one final caveat is a pp ropriate. The JAE editors 
have assigned others the task of surveying two topics that deal with issues that 
are germane to my discussion: contract theory in accounting and disclosure in the 
empirical accounting literature.2 In this document every attempt is made to eschew 
these topics so as to minimize the overlap among surveys. 
A brief summary of this paper is as follows. Essays on association-based, discretionary-
based, and efficiency-based d isclosure are offered in sections 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
In the final section of the paper, section 5, I summarize my observations and briefly 
discuss suggestions for future research. 
l There exists a veritable cornucopia of research on this topic; thus, as a triage in preparing the 
references I did not include working pap ers (including my own) . 
2 For the former, see Lambert [2000]; for t he la tter, see Healy a nd P alepu [2000] and Core [2000]. 
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2 Association-Based Disclosure 
How is disclosure associated with, or related to, the change or disruption in the activ-
ities of investors who are diverse and compet e in capital market settings t o maximize 
their indiv idual welfares? Association-based d isclosure research attempts to examine 
this problem by characterizing the effects of disclosure on t he cumulative actions of 
individual , investor agent s at the time of a disclosure event . T wo characterizations of 
aggregate or cumulative behavior that are of particular interest in association-based 
studies concern the relations between disclosure and price changes, and disclosure and 
trading volume. In offering characterizations of this nature, association-based stud-
ies attempt to extend the literature on economics-based representations of financial 
markets with diverse investor agents that go back at least as far as Lint ner.3 
The motivation for this essay is two-fold. F irst, I offer a straightforward historical 
account of the evolution of t he association-based lit erature. Second, to the extent to 
which a comprehensive theory is required to incorporate the effects of disclosure on 
the behavior of individ ual, welfare-maximizing agents who interact in capital market 
settings, I discuss general issues related to this t opic . The hist orical account itself 
is done through a series of modeling vignettes. The role of the vignettes is to show 
how the literature developed, with increasingly more sophisticated m odels subsuming 
earlier, simpler models as deficiencies in prior work were identified. In addit ion, 
the modeling-vignette presentation format allows me to comment on the variety of 
maintained assumptions employed in this literature, and to point the interested reader 
in the direction of work that discusses the role of these assumpt ions in greater depth. 
3 Specifically, Lintner [1968). See also Karpoff [1987), who surveys the literature on t he relation 
between price changes and trading volume in capital markets through 1987, and p oints to the 
deficiency of most of the theory-based literature to explain price-volume relations up to that point 
in time (i.e. , 1987). 
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A brief summary of t he vignettes is as follows. Model # 1 introduces a very st yl-
ized representation of disclosure and price cha nge; its primary purpose is to motivat e 
subsequent d iscussion. Model #2 introduces d isclosure in a Walrasian setting . Mod-
els # 3-6 ext end that discussion t o settings in which market agent s condition their 
expectations over market clearing prices (i.e., so-called "rational expectations" mod-
els of trade) : first in one-period settin gs and then in two-period settings. In m od el #7 
disclosure is examined in conjunction w ith heuristic behavior and perfectly com peti-
tive markets. In m odels #8 and # 9, disclosure is considered in the context of m od els 
of imperfect competit ion; first with market agents who are exclusively Bayesian and 
then with agents who are Bayesian and heuristic. Fina lly, in model # 10, disclo-
sure is d iscussed in a sett ing in which market expectations are conditioned over both 
contemporaneous demand a nd t rading volume inform ation. 
A Simple Model of Disclosure Association (model #1).4 To illustrate the 
evolution of research on d isclosure associat ion and other ideas, I begin by suggesting 
a very st ylized model of disclosure. T o start, I assume that there exists some asset 
(e.g., a firm) whose value is uncertain, and about which some information is disclosed. 
Uncertainty can be represented by a random variable of a ny variety, but the normal 
distribution is well behaved m athematically a nd u nderstood at an intuitive level by 
most researchers. Consequently, I assume that uncertain firm value is represent ed 
by a va riable u, which has a normal distribution with mean m and precision (i.e ., 
the reciprocal of varia nce) h. T he precision h can be interpreted as t he market's 
p revailing level of common knowledge about t he firm' s u ncert a in value, u. Simila rly, 
I assume t hat the d isclosure is informat ion about firm value, but information that is 
less t han perfect . For example, let disclosure be represent ed by fj = u + fj, where fj is 
4 In conjunction with model # 1, see Holthausen a nd Verrecchia [1988] and Subra ma nyam [1996]. 
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also a normal distribut ion with m ean 0 and p recision n . I int erpret, and refer t o, n as 
the precision of t he information cont ent of the d isclosure, fj . Fina lly, I assume t hat 
all relevant issues related t o disclosure can be cha racterized by assumin g an economy 
with two periods : time T - 1 is the period immediately before disclosure occurs, and 
time Tis t he time immediately a fter (i.e., the disclosure period ). Let t he prices for 
the assets at t im es T - 1 and T b e represented by Pr -1 a nd Pr, respectively. 
Before pro ceeding, let me comment on the role of a number of ma int ained as-
sumptions. F irst, as alluded t o in t he introduction, disclosure, i.e., fj = ii + ij , is 
an exogenous feature of t he economy I describe . By v irtue of this, no where have I 
est ablished a rat ionale, or demand, for the disclosure in the first place. Presumably, 
however, a n interested reader can look t o the t wo subsequent essays for guidance as 
to why disclosure may be either supplied or demanded in t he context of the econ-
omy I describe. For reasons of pure ped agogy, it is convenient t o start out with 
the assumption t hat d isclosure simply "exists," and deal with the ra tionale for that 
disclosure later. Second, I describe an economy t hat is comprised of only a single 
risky asset (and, starting with model # 2, a risk-free numeraire commodit y ). Unlike 
the assumption of exogenous d isclosu re, this assumpt ion is maintained throughout 
m y essays . Where the role of multiple risky assets has been considered in settings 
similar to the ones that I a m about to discuss , one typically finds that claims or 
results tha t a rise in a single-asset economy can be reversed.5 R eversal may occur 
in mult iple-asset economies beca use of int eractions among assets. Consequently, a 
mainta ined assumption here is t hat one can control for m ult iple-asset effects . Fina lly, 
my analysis is ceteris paribus: t hat is , my analysis is premised on t he notion t hat a ll 
elements other than t he ones I study are fixed, or const ant . For example, consider a 
5 See, for example, Admati [1985] and Holt hausen and Verrecchia [1988]. 
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multiple-asset economy in which firms in one industry manufacture a pples and firms 
in anot her manufacture oranges. In addit ion, suppose t hat disclosu re has different 
effects on the valuation of, and/or t he production or coordination-related activ ities 
within, the apple manufacturing industry versus the orange m anufacturing indust ry. 
Then a comparison of the effects of disclosure on apple versus orange ma nufactur-
ing firms is flawed because other features of the comparison are not fixed. As with 
multiple-asset effects, I abstract from this problem. 
Cont inuing with the discussion of association-based resea rch, as manifestat ions of 
the disruption in the cumulative actions of investors, there are a variety of phenomena 
one could study. A very incomplete list might include: the functional relation between 
disclosure and price change; the functional relat ion between d isclosure and t rading 
volume; the extent t o which disclosure changes the collective uncertainty about the 
asset's value at the time of the disclosure event; the extent to which disclosure makes 
markets more liquid; etc. Many of these phenomena are d iscussed in the original 
source documents. To provide some appreciation for an analysis of that type, I 
start with t wo. First, I consider the functional relationship between a n exogenous 
disclosure, fj, and the change in an asset's price at timeT, Pr-PT-1· Second, I assess 
the percentage of t he variabilit y in price change at time T explained exclusively by 
the disclosure (controlling for certain key factors) . To illustrate these vehicles for 
studying the effects of disclosure, suppose for a moment tha t the change in price at 
time T has the following functional form 
where a , {3 , and 1 are (fixed) parameters, f2 represents variables other than fj that 
are relat ed t o firm value and t he change in price, and 1;. represents variables unrelated 
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to firm value (e.g., noise) . Here, one could interpret the coefficient on f), /3, as that 
element of the functional relation in the change in price that results directly from 
disclosure, as opposed to other factors. When in the discussion below the change in 
price assumes a linear functional form like the one above, for convenience I refer to 
/3 as the disclosure response coefficient (DRC) in the change in price. 
A DRC tells us something about how the change in price relies on, or is governed 
by, disclosure, as dist inct from other factors . For example, intuition suggests that 
as the models become increasingly more complicat ed, the DRC w ill decline because 
ot her factors , such as the ex istence of private information as a subst itute for public 
disclosure, will reduce the reliance of prices on disclosure. But to confirm this in-
tuition, and perhaps also to highlight where it fails, I consider also the percentage 
of the va riability in price change expla ined exclusively by disclosure . In computing 
this percentage, I control for cert ain key factors . Which factors one cont rols for is 
somewhat arb itrary, but here I suggest controlling for the pr ice at timeT- 1, Pr-1, 
and noise, ~. The reason for controlling for the price a t time T - 1 is that I want to 
eliminate from the variabilit y of price change that part of the variability that arises 
from activities prior to the disclosure, as captured by Pr-1· In addition, I want to 
control for noise because its contribution t o the variance in price change is not eco-
nomically relevant. Let .6.% represent the percent age of the varia bility of price change 
expla ined exclusively by disclosure a t time T. When one controls for both price at 
time T - 1 and noise, the percentage of the variability explained by the disclosure at 
time T is defined by 
.6.% = 1 _ VAR[Pr-_:: Pr-~ l iJ = y, Pr -1 = Pr=h~ = ~l . 
V AR [Pr- Pr-1 IPr-1 = Pr-1, ~ = ~] 
When in the discussion below I discuss the percentage of variability explained by 
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disclosure, for convenience I refer to it t he ".6. %-sta tistic." 
Now I return t o developing a very stylized model of price change and disclosure. 
In this model I assume that a ll investor agents who participate in the market are 
risk-neutral, can assume unlimited liability for realizations of firm value, and have 
no information (private or public) about firm value at time T- 1. Because of the 
absence of information, at time T- 1 all expectations are based on the unconditional 
expectation of ii, which is m . Furthermore, because invest or agents a re risk-neutral, 
the price of the asset at t imeT- 1 is Pr-1 = m . At timeT d isclosure occurs (i.e ., 
fj = y is disclosed); I assume that it is eit her the only informat ion about firm value, or, 
if there is other information about firm value revealed at the same time (e.g ., privat e 
information), it is subsumed in fj = y . T hat is, with regard t o valuing the firm, fj is a 
sufficient statistic for fj and a ll other information. If fj = y is a sufficient statistic for a ll 
information and investors are risk-neutral, then Pr = E [iiliJ = y] = m + h :n (y - m ) . 
This implies 
n -
Pr- Pr-1 = h + n (y- m ) , 
where t he expression fj - m can be interpreted as t he "disclosure surprise" in tha t it 
represents the ext ent to which fj = y deviates from it s expected value of m, which 
is also the expected value of ii . Here, the DRC is hn ; it can be describ ed as the 
+n 
precision of t he disclosure, n, relative to the t otal precision of firm value conditiona l 
on t he disclosure, h + n. In ot her words, t he DRC is t he information content of the 
disclosure relative to a ll t hat is known about firm value subsequent to the d isclosure . 
Finally, note t ha t in t his simple model all the variability in price change is explained 
by disclosure at timeT. For example, V AR[Pr- Pr -1 IY = y] = 0. Consequently, this 
model's .6.%-stat ist ic is 1. 
Before proceeding, let me briefly mention t he role of two more assumptions t hat I 
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maintain throughout these essays. Unlimited liability ensures that price change char-
acterizations remain facile and transparent . This virtue not withstanding, in m odels 
of the type that I discuss below researchers have long recognized that unlimited li-
ability is a n artifact and therefore have studied its role.6 For example, unlimited 
liability is proba bly a poor assumption if one intends to study t he role of equity in 
conjunction with debt as vehicles for financing a firm' s activities. As for the assump-
tion tha t fj = y is a sufficient statistic, a conventional interpretation of sufficiency is 
that any information in existence prior to period Tis a forecast of fj , which the actual 
disclosure of fj in period T subsumes. 7 
Continuing with the discussion, in the evolution of analyses that purport to asso-
ciate disclosure with price change, the characterization offered so far is transparent 
and facile.8 Nonetheless, the model's elegance is achieved at the expense of an ex-
treme stylization of how markets function. In this model, for example, there is no 
information about firm value that has any relevance other than the information t hat 
arises directly from disclosure. Perhaps more significant, the model describes a world 
in which no trade occurs. The reason for this is that beliefs are homogeneous in both 
periods T - 1 and T, and hence there is no rationale for t rade based on information. 
So, if a minimum condition for "model robustness" is that some trading volume arises 
at the time of disclosure, more work remains. 
To a chieve trading volume, it is likely that we will need to appeal to som e elements 
of investor-agent diversity, because trade evolves primarily from differences across 
6 See, for example, Fischer and Verrecchia 11997]. 
7 See, for example, Abarbanell, et al. [1995 . 
8 Some might even argue that it captures well the spirit, if perhaps not the detail, of a n empirical 
investigation of the relation between disclosure and price change. Note, however, that t his charac-
terization implies that price changes are normally distributed, whereas empirical studies typically 
assume that returns are normally distributed. While this dislocation between theory and empirical 
work is fairly innocuous, it points to the fact that some caution should be exercised in interpreting 
too litera lly any statements that I make in the contex t of empirical-based research. 
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investors: for example, differences of opinion, differences in endowments, differences 
in how investors use information, etc. Consequently, let me first put forth a list of 
attributes of investor-agent rationality and diversity that it would seem important 
for a model to incorporate, or at least address, in any theory-based characterization 
of the interactions of individual, welfare-maximizing agents who compete in capital 
market settings. Having done that, in the subsequent discussion I successively fold 
into the model each attribute, as a way of understanding how the attribute affects 
assumptions and conclusions of prior work. The list is as follows. 
1. Investors are diversely informed. 
2. Invest ors make rational inferences from market prices. 
3. Investors rationally anticipate disclosure. 
4 . Investors, in addition to being diversely informed, a lso have information of 
diverse or heterogeneous quality. 
5 . Invest ors interpret disclosure in d iverse ways. 
6. Invest ors incorporate disclosure into their beliefs in diverse ways: that is , some 
agents depart from (narrowly) Bayesian behavior in how they incorporate disclosure 
into their posterior expectations. 
7. Invest ors condition their beliefs over diverse economic stimuli: specifically, they 
make rational inferences from both market prices and trading volume. 
Diversely informed investors (model #2).9 I start with the following ex-
panded story of a market with trade. There are a large number of investor agents, 
say, N, who exchange shares in the asset whose value is uncertain by comparing it s 
value relative t o a numeraire commo dit y, whose value is fixed at 1 (e.g., a govern-
ment bond). Each investor i holds an amount xi of the uncertain-valued asset, and an 
9 In conjunction with model #2, see Lintner [1968] . 
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amount bi of the certain-valued asset . For convenience, let x represent t he per-capita 
supply of the uncertain-valued asset, where x is defined by x = ~i (xi/N ). As this 
analysis evolves, it will be useful to allow for t he fact that t he per-capita supply of the 
uncertain-valued asset, x, is also a normally distributed ra ndom variable with mean 0 
and precision t. When, below, I examine t he variability of price changes arising from 
disclosure, my intentions are t o int erpret x as noise a nd t as the precision of the noise. 
Finally, while there are two asset -types in this economy, for all int ents a nd purposes 
only the uncerta in-valued asset will concern u s. C onsequently, for convenience and 
wherever it creat es no confusion, henceforth I will refer to the u ncertain-valued asset 
as simply "the asset ." 
Before proceeding, not e that another assumpt ion mainta ined t hroughout this 
analysis is that the first moment (i.e ., mean) of a ll other random variables is zero 
(with t he exception of the mean of uncertain firm value, ii ). In particular, t he error 
term around the disclosure of firm value, ~ ' has a mean of 0. If we treat disclosure 
as exogenous, which is a feature of the associat ion-based d isclosure literature, the 
assumption that all means are zero would appear t o be without loss of generality. 
W hen disclosure is t reated as endogenous, however, one would need to recognize that 
disclosure prepa rers and disseminators may not have incentives that a re perfectly 
aligned wit h the goal of providing unbiased assessments of firm value. T he existence 
of disclosure, or reporting, bias is an important issue in financial reporting, where 
often data are produced and d isseminated in conjunction with achieving some ob-
jective .10 Nonetheless, I abstract from t his issue here in a n attempt to facilit ate the 
discussion. 
lOOn specifically the topic of reporting bias , see F ischer a nd Verrecchia [2000]. M ore generally, t his 
issue touches on concerns related to the truthfulness or credibility of the disclosure. This is a t opic 
reserved for the second essay. 
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As in our previous model, I assume that at time T - 1 there is no information 
about the asset (i.e., t he uncertain-valued asset). Consequently, as in our previous 
model Pr-1 = m. Before trade takes place at time T, however, each investor i 
obtains different private information about the value of u, where this information is 
represented by zi = u + Ei and Ei also has a normal distribution with mean 0 and 
precision s, say. The parameter Ei is also a "noise" term. As such, it captures the 
extent to which each investor's information about t he uncertain value of the asset is 
accurate. For example, a high s denotes very accurate private information , and a low 
s denotes very inaccurate information. For convenience, henceforth I assume that the 
covariance across any pair of error terms is zero : for example, E [f/£i ] = E [EiEj] = 0. 
This implies that u, y, and zi have a trivariate normal distribution with means of 
( m, m, m) and a covariance matrix given by 
h-1 h-1 + n-1 h-1 
h-1 h-1 h-1 + s-1 
Consequently, when investors condition their expectations over the public disclosure 
and their private information, their expectations are 
[-I ·] _ hm + ny + szi E u y, z, - , 
h+n + s 
and the precision of their ex pectations, (V AR[uly, zi ]) - 1, is 
Finally, I assume that the E'/ s have finite variance; because of this, limN -;oo ~ L:i E:i ~ 
0 for any realizations of c/s by the law of large numbers. Note that this implies for 
any realizations of t he z/s, limN-;oo ~ L:i zi ~ u. 
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Note that another maintained assumption is that errors are uncorrelated. As 
with the introduction of multiple risky assets, correlated errors may reverse claims 
and results found in uncorrelat ed error set tings. 11 Nonetheless , I abstract from this 
l SSUe. 
If the motivation for extending our model is to ensure trading volume, then it is 
useful to relax our assumption that all investors are risk-neutral. When all investors 
are risk-neutral and have different private informat ion, trading volume can arise. It 
will be, however, of a very st ylized nature. In effect, t hat investor with the highest 
conditional expectation for the value of the asset at timeT (i.e. , the investor with the 
highest E [uiy, zi]) will acquire at a minimum the total supply of the asset . Indeed, 
the extent to which the investor with the highest conditional expectation will go long 
in the asset is only limited by the ability and/ or cost of other traders to sell the asset 
short. 
To ensure that trade is less stylized , I assume that investor agents are risk averse, 
with a utility for an amount of a consumable good g given by U(g) = - exp [- ;J, 
where r measures an investor's tolerance for risk. This utility function is the (nega-
tive) exponential, and has reasonably desirable properties for a utility function: it is 
increasing and concave in g, implying that an investor prefers more of a consumable 
good to less, but t o a decreasing degree. The true appeal of the negative exponential, 
however, is that when it is used in conjunction with the normal distribution, it results 
in a facile analysis. Finally, note that homogeneous risk tolerances across risk-averse 
invest or agents is a maintained assumption throughout the analysis . T his is a very 
innocuous assumption, however, in that it is a straightforward exercise to generalize 
all the models that I discuss below to allow for heterogeneous risk t olerances (which 
11See, for example, Lundholm [1988]. 
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is commonly done in the original source documents). 
Our next step is to determine the Pr. To do this, I appeal to the notion that 
the large number of investors inhabiting our market ensures that Pr evolves from 
perfect competition. To dwell on the notion of perfect competition briefly, note that 
perfect competition assumes that each investor agent in the market behaves as if his 
or her actions or behaviors have no effect on price, a nd in equilibrium this conjecture 
is true. In theory-based characterizations of trade, perfect competition is achieved 
by assuming that the number of investor agents in t he market is large (typically, 
count ably infinite). This ensures that while prices reflect the combined decisions of all 
market participants at an aggregate level, t he actions of each individual market agent 
are sufficiently atomistic as to have no appreciable effect on price. By all accounts 
perfect competition seems to be a reasonable assumption about markets that are deep 
and / or assets that are widely traded. In addition, suffice it to say here that one reason 
why perfect competition is a favored vehicle for disclosure association studies is that 
it simplifies considerably the "game" that market agents play towards determining 
the market equilibrium price. That is, by v irtue of the fact that each individual 
investor agent can ignore the effect of his or her action on price, determining an 
equilibrium price is simplified considerably, but especially in circumstances in which 
trade is assumed to occur over multiple periods (which I discuss below). 
In conjunction with perfect competition, I also appeal to Walras. 12 Walras' notion 
of how market clearing prices are det ermined in markets where divisible assets (e.g ., 
firm shares) are exchanged could be describ ed somewhat colloquially as follows . First, 
investors submit their demand curves for an asset to a beneficent and altruistic market 
maker (commonly referred to as a ''Walrasian auctioneer") . Investors' demand curves 
12See Walras [1881]; see a lso Wald [1951]. 
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represent t heir demands for the asset as a function of the price of the asset . Armed 
wit h this information, the W alrasian auctioneer d etermines the price t hat equates the 
aggregate demand for the asset (i.e., the aggregation of indiv idual demand curves) to 
the t otal aggregat e supply. T his price "clears the market," and hence represents the 
equilibrium. 
Now consider invest or i's demand for the asset whose value is uncertain versus 
the asset whose value remains fixed at 1, condit ional on his private information Z; . 
Let D; represent the demand for uncertain-va lued asset and B ; represent the demand 
for the asset whose value is fixed at 1. The p rice at which the former t rades is Pr, 
and t he price at which the latter trades is 1. Thus, the value of investor i 's endowed 
portfolio is x ;Pr + b;. The cost of holding a portfolio represented by D; and B; is 
D;Pr + B;, and the return on holding that portfolio is D;u + B; . Taken all t ogether, 
this implies that the net return for hold ing a portfolio represented by Di and B; (and 
net ofthe proceeds from the value of i's endowed portfolio) is D;(u - Pr) +x;Pr + b;. 
The expected value of this port folio to investor i, based on his private information z ; 
and y, is E[U (D;(ii - Pr) + xiPT + b;) IY, z;]. 
To determine a value for Pr, first I must compute each investor's demand forD; 
and B;. W hen the negative exponential utility function is used in combination with 
the normal distribution function, it yields a result that is linear in t he argument of 
t he exponential: that is, 
E [U (Di(ii - Pr) + x ;Pr + bi) IY,zi] 
1 1 2 1 1 1 
- exp[--D;E[ii ly , zi ] + -
2 2
D ; VAR [u iy, z ;] + -DiPr - - x;Pr- - b;]. 
r r r r r 
In determining his opt imal portfolio, each investor chooses D; so as to maximize the 
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above. This yields 
Di = r E[uly, z;] - Pr. 
VAR [u ly, z;] 
This is a standard demand equation result ing from the negative exponent ial in con-
junction with the normal distribution. It suggest s that t he demand for t he asset is 
equal to: a n investor's expectation of the value of the a sset conditiona l on his privat e 
information and the d isclosure, minus the price of the asset; an adjustment for his 
t olerance for risk (i.e., r ); and an adjustment for (in the d enominator) t he confidence 
he has in his posterior expect ations (i.e ., VAR [uly,z;]) . Straightforward result s from 
multiva riate normality imply t hat E [uly, z;] = m + h+~+s (y- m) + h+~+Jz; -m) and 
V AR[u ly, z;] = h+~+ s. Consequently, D; can be rewritten as 
D; = r (hm + ny + sz ; - {h + n + s }Pr). 
Now our st ated goal remains to endogenize Pr . Pr is determined by equating 
the per-capita supply of the asset (i.e. , the uncertain-valued asset ) with per-capita 
demand; the Pr that achieves t his , i.e. , x = 2.:; (x;jN) = 2.:; (D;jN), is 
Pr = hm + nfj + s lim - L z; - -x 1 ( 1 1 ) 
h + n + s N ->co N i r 
h 
1 (hm + n fj + su - ~x) . 
+n + s r 
Hence, 
Pr-Pr-1= 
1 (n (y - m) + s(u - m)- ~x) . h + n + s r 
Note that E [Pr] = m and E [Pr - Pr- 1] = 0. An interpretation of Pr - Pr- 1 IS 
that it represents: the change in the expect ation of u averaged across a ll investors, 
where t he change is adjust ed for t he posterior precision of t heir expectations based 
on t heir knowledge of y and z; ; and adjusted furt her by t he per-capita supply of the 
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uncertain-valued asset (which is also adjusted for investors ' tolerance for risk, r ). The 
"supply adjustment ," - r (h+,n+s) x, can be thought of as the extent to which the price 
of the asset at timeT, PT, must be reduced below variables whose expected value is 
m, the expected value of the asset (i.e., E [ h+~+s (hm +ny + su)] = m ), to attract 
investors w ho are risk-averse (assuming that the realization of the per-capita supply 
of the asset, i.e., x, is positive) . If, for example, investors' tolerance for risk is very 
large, which implies t hat they are approximately risk-neutral, then r -----+ oo a nd the 
adjustment is 0. Similarly, if the precision of their posterior expectations is very large, 
which implies that they a re almost certain of the asset's value, then h + n + s-----+ oo 
and once again the adjustment is 0. 
To digress briefly, another maintained assumption is that there exists a continuum 
of traders . Consequently, one cannot talk meaningfully about how increasing the 
investor base (i.e., the number of people who participate in the market) affects prices 
or price changes. Note, however, that r is per-capita risk tolerance. As such, one 
could interpret r as a proxy for investor base: that is, as the investor base increases, 
r mcreases. Allowing this interpret ation and assuming for the moment that the 
realization of the per-capita supply of the asset is posit ive (i.e. , xis positive), this 
implies that a n increase in investor base (i.e., r) result s in an increase in the change 
in price: effectively, an increase in returns.l3 
The salient feature of this model is that the DRC declines to -h n . As discussed 
+n+s 
previously, the reason for its decline is that there now exists in the economy private 
information, in the form of the zi's , and this lessens t he reliance of price on disclosure. 
l 3See, for example, Merton [1987]. Note that if there were only a finite number of market par-
ticipants, it would be more transparent that as t heir number increased (i.e. , as the investor base 
increased), t he supply adjustment would decrease, and hence the cha nge in price would increase. 
Making the number of market participants finite, however, creates problems in conjunction with 
assuming perfect competition. 
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With rega rd to t his m odel's .6. %-st atistic, one interpret a tion of per-capit a supply 
is tha t it represents a variable unrelat ed to t he asset's true, economic value, but which 
nonetheless a ffect s price cha nge t hrough t he sup ply of t he asset (and risk aversion) . 
As such, in the context of this discussion I interpret per-capita supply, x, as a proxy for 
the noise term, 2, d iscussed previously. Using x as a proxy for ~' V AR[Pr - Pr-1 lx] = 
(h+~+sl (n2 (h:nn) + 2ns~ +s2k) and VAR [Pr- Pr-1l y,x] = ( h+ ~+s) 2 c:n): note 
t hat it is not necessary t o cont rol for pr ice at t imeT- 1 in t hese expressions because 
Pr -1 is fixed at m. Consequent ly, here the .6. %-stat ist ic red uces to 
s2 
.6.% 1 _ h+n 
n2 (h+n) + 2nsl + s21 hn h h 
n 2 (h+n ) + 2ns l + 82_ n_ hn h h(h+n) 
n 2 (h+n) + 2nsl + s21 hn h h 
which is clearly less than 1 because h(hr:_n) < k· In ot her words, consistent with the 
decline in t he DRC, in this m odel disclosure expla ins less t ha n 100% of t he variability 
in price change. T he reason for this should be clear: in t his variat ion there exists 
privat e, as well as p ub lic, informat ion ab out t he value of t he asset. Had , for example, 
t here been no pr ivate informat ion (i.e ., s = 0), t hen here once again t he .6.%-statist ic 
would b e 1. 
To summa rize t he analysis t o t his p oint, as a characterizat ion of the association 
between d isclosure a nd price change, a Walrasian m odel has ma ny ap pealing features. 
But it is not wit hout controversy, which is the motivation for our next section. 
Rat ional Inferences from Market Prices (model #3). 14 W hile Walras' 
notion of perfect com pet ition offers ma ny insight s into t he price setting process, it 
14Jn conjunction with model # 3, see Hellwig [1980], Diamond and Ver recchia [1981], and Lundholm 
[1988]. W it h regard t o the last pa per , not e that Lundholm's chief concern is the role of cor re-
lated errors , whereas a m aintained a ssumption throughout this ana lysis is that all error terms are 
u ncorrelat ed. 
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can nonet heless be argued that it is conceptually flawed . Implicit in a Walrasian 
equilibrium is the not ion t hat investors' beliefs about what the asset is worth are 
fixed, or invariant, t o the price at which the market cleared . This was sometimes 
referred to as an "exogenous beliefs" model. The conceptual flaw in a n exogenous 
beliefs model is tha t if investors are able t o submit a n entire demand curve to an 
auctioneer, then they should also be able t o submit demand curves based on their 
expectations of what an asset is worth as a function of the market-clearing price. In 
other words, if t heir demands are a function of price, then their beliefs can also be 
a function of price, which, in turn, can affect their demands.15 Market equilibria in 
which investors condition their expectations over the price at which markets clear are 
dubbed ''rational expectations" models of trade. 
An intuitive way to distinguish between a Walrasian and a rat ional expectations 
model of trade is t o imagine first a price setting process under Walras. Here, investors 
determine their demand for an asset based on their tolerance for risk, information 
about what the asset is worth , and other preference characteristics. Then they sub-
mit t heir demand curves to an auctioneer, who determines the price at which the 
supply of the asset equilibrates against the aggregate demand. Now suppose t hat 
the auctioneer calls out t he market-clearing p rice she determines. In Walras, not hing 
more would happen - this price would be the price at which trades are executed. In 
a rational expectations equilibrium, however, investors would start grumbling "well, 
had I known in advance that t he market-clearing price was t o be the one that was 
ultimately called out, then I would have changed my beliefs accordingly, and sub-
mitted a d ifferent demand curve." Presumably t his grumbling would abrogat e the 
equilibrium, and t he auctioneer would be compelled to a llow investors t o submit a 
15See Grossman [1976, 1978]. 
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second round of demand curves, based on their revised beliefs. Now imagine a second 
round of trade in which a different market clearing price is called out, and once again 
investors grumble t hat had t hey known t hat t his revised price was to be t he market 
clearing price, they would have submitt ed yet another set of demand curves. And so 
on and so forth, until eventually the auctioneer calls out a price, and at that price no 
investor ha s a ny desire to recontract (e.g., they would cease grumbling) . The price 
at which investors have no further interest in recontacting would be the rational ex-
pectations market clearing price. Stated somewhat differently, in Walras' set t ing the 
market -clearing price of a n a sset is a function of investors ' expectations, but not the 
reverse, whereas in a rational expectations equilibrium, price is a function of expec-
tations and expectations are a function of price. Note that the expression "rational 
expectations" t o describe models in this genre of literature is somewhat misleading 
in that these m odels sim ply introduce as a modeling innovation the requirement t hat 
investor agents condition their expectations on market-clearing prices . Perhaps as an 
alternative one should dub this research "price-conditioned" models of trade. 
"Trading-up" from a Walrasian to a rat ional expectations model of trade requires 
some additional analysis . In particular, t he key feature of a rational expectat ions 
equilibrium is t hat investors conjecture that the market -clearing price of the asset 
contains information about what the asset is worth. Consequently, when investors 
condition t heir expectations over price, in add ition t o t heir private information, they 
glean more insight into the asset's uncertain va lue than had t hey ignored price. Here, 
I continue with all the assumptions int roduced previously, but , in addit ion, assume 
that investors conjecture tha t the m a rket equilibrium price at time T is of the form 
Pr = a + bii + cfj - dx, 
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where a, b, and care fixed para met ers. Define q as 
_ Pr - a - cy _ d _ 
q = = U - - X . 
b b 
The variable q represents t he additional information investors glean from price by 
manipulat ing it to yield t he essent ia l information about u. When investors use q in 
conjunction with u, f) , and i;, a quarto-variate normal d istribution results with means 
of ( m , m , m, m) and a covariance matrix given by 
h-1 h-1 h-1 h-1 
h-1 h-1 + n -1 h-1 h-1 
h-1 h-1 h-1 + 8-1 h-1 
h-1 h-1 h-1 h-1 + (~f c1 
Consequently, when invest ors condition t heir expectations over disclosure, their pri-
vat e information, a nd price (through q) as an additional source of information, their 
expect ations are 
_ hm + ny + sz; + (£) 2 tq 
E [u ly, z; , q] = , h + n + s +(~) t 
and the precision of their expectations, (V AR[u ly , z; , q])- 1, is 
(VAR [U[y, z ;,q]) - 1 ~ h + n + s + ( £ )' t. 
To determine a value for Pr, once again first I must compute each investor 's 
demand for D;. As before, the negative exponential utility function yields a result 
that is linear in the argument of the exponential: that is, 
E[U (D;(u - Pr) + x;Pr + b; ) IY, Z; , q] 
1 1 2 1 1 1 
- exp[--D;E[u ly, z;, q] + -
2 2 
D; V AR[u ly, z ;, q] + - D;Pr- - x;Pr - - b;] . 
r r r r r 
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In determining his opt imal portfolio, each investor chooses Di so a s to maximize the 
above. This yields 
which is the same ex pression as before except for t he fact t hat now investors are condi-
tioning their expectations on price (t hrough q) in ad dit ion t o y and Z; . Consequently, 
D ; can be rewrit ten as 
As before, I endogenize Pr by equa ting t he per-capit a supply of the uncert ain-
valued asset with the per-capital demand: in other words, by set ting x = L i (x;jN ) = 
L; (D;/N ). When one does this, t he value of Pr that results is 
---
1
-----,r- ( hm + nfj + (!!.) 2 tq + s lim _.!._ :L z;- .!.x \} 
h + n + s + ( ~) 2 t \ d N ---->oo N i r 
1 (hm + nfj + (s + (!!.) 2 t) u - (.!. + !!.t) x) . 
h + n + s + (~) t d r d 
Note that for investors' original conjecture t hat Pr = a+ bu + cy - dx to be self-
fulfilling (i.e. , rat ional) , it must be that 
b 
d 
s + (~f t 
1 + E.t ' 
r d 
which implies ~ = rs. Hence, a self-fulfilling equilib rium can be characterized by the 
coefficients a, b, c, and d in t he expression Pr = a+bu+cfj - dx assuming the following 
forms: a = h m . b = s + (r s) 2 t . c = n . and d = ..,....--'-----,,........,...-r-
h + n + s +(r s) t ' h + n+s + (r s ) t ' h+n +s+ (rs) t ' 
in turn, implies 
Pr - Pr-1 = 
1 
2 2 (n (f) - m) + (s + r2 s2t) ( u - m) - (.!. + r st) x) . h+n +s+rs t r 
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Note that this express10n for t he change in price is identical to the previOus case, 
except for the addit ional information related t o conditioning ex pectat ions over price. 
In effect, conditioning expectations over price creates an additional "information kick" 
that results in more precise beliefs in the rational expectations model than in the 
Walrasian model. Specifically, the precision of expectations in the former is h + n + 
s + r2 s2t, and in the latter h + n + s. This implies that the "information kick" is r2 s2t. 
Here, the DRC also reflects the additional informat ion gleaned from price: specif-
ically, the DRC is h +n+: +r2s2t. The DRC is lower than in the Walrasian case because 
investors rely in part on price in a rational expectat ions model, and hence rely corre-
spondingly less on disclosure. In addition, note that in t his model VAR[Pr-Pr~l lx] = 
(h+n+~+rzs2t ) 2 ( n 2 ( hh:n ) + 2n (s + r2s 2t) t + (s + r 2s2t)2 t) and V AR[Pr-Pr-liY, x] = 
( s +r
2
s
2
t )
2 
(-1-) Consequently, here the .6. %-stat istic reduces to h+n+s +rLsLt h +n · 
( s +r 2 s2 t ) 2 
.6.% 1- h+ n 
n 2 (h:nn ) + 2n (s + r2s2t) t + (s + r2 s2t)2 t 
n 2 ( h +n) + 2n (s + r 2s 2t) 1 + (s + r2s 2t )2 _ n_ h n h Mh+~ 
As in the Walrasian case, the .6. %-sta tistic in the rational expectations model is 
less than 1. The .6. %-statistic in the rational expectations case, however, is lower 
than in the Walrasian case (I leave this as an exercise for the interested reader) . 
This suggests that the a dditional information about the asset gleaned from price 
in a rational expectations model implies less reliance on disclosure, and hence less 
variability in price change at time T explained by disclosure at time T. 
Before proceeding to the next model, let me mention the role of two more main-
tained assumptions. Among the various conjectures that invest ors could make about 
the market equilibrium price at timeT, a maintained assumption in the "rational ex-
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pectations" literature is t hat invest ors make linear conjectures about t he functiona l 
form of the market clearing price : t hat is, Pr = a + bu + cy - dx. This in no way 
precludes, or rules out , t he possibilit y t ha t t here exist other, nonlinear conjectures 
that also lead t o self-fulfilling equilibria. T hese alternative conjectures are s imply not 
studied . Note t hat this restriction to linear conjectures is not unique to t his lit era-
t ure. Models of imperfect compet ition , which are d iscussed below, are also premised 
on linea r conjectu res about t he functional form of price.16 
Another mainta ined assu mption in model #3 is t hat invest ors have diverse privat e 
information. A competing m odel to t he one d iscussed here is one in which invest ors 
are only one of two t y pes: informed, a nd uninformed who glean some knowledge by 
conditioning t heir b eliefs on price.17 In t he lat t er mo del price is only a communicator 
of information from t he in form ed to the uninformed. Alt ernatively, in model #3 price 
is b oth an aggregator of informat ion in t hat price aggregates the d iverse beliefs of 
many invest ors (as manifest in the zi ), and a com m un icator of t h is aggregat ed data. 
Rational Anticipation of Disclosure (model #4). 18 W hile a llowing rationa l 
inferences from prices appea rs t o be a clear improvem ent over the W alrasian model at 
relat ively litt le cost in tract a bility, argua bly t here is yet anot her flaw. The flaw is t hat 
as t he market setting was described a bove, t here is no prior round of t rade that a llows 
market participants to resolve t heir differences (e.g., d ifferences in risk preferences, 
differences in end owments, d ifferences in private beliefs) p rior t o disclosure. R esolv ing 
differences t hrough a prior round of trade is crucial t o an association study, because 
wit hout it a host of other factors unrelated to disclosure a re comm ingled int o the 
l 6See , for example, the d iscussion of model #8 below. 
l 7See, for example, Grossman an d Stiglitz [1980] a nd Demski and Feltham [1994]. 
l 8Jn conjunction with model # 4, see Grundy a nd McNichols [1989] and Brow n and Jennings [1989] . 
Note t ha t in Grundy a nd McNichols investors' preannouncement informa tion structure consists of 
a common prior, privat e information w ith common error , and id iosyncratic errors wit h iden t ical 
p recision, w hereas here the common error t erm is ignored. 
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change in price at the time of disclosure. For example, imagine a setting in which 
market pa rticipants enter a market at the beginning of the period to exchange shares 
of an asset and, based on their demands , a ma rket-clearing p rice is established at the 
end of t he period. In addition, imagine that as t hey enter t he market, t here is some 
public disclosure about t he asset's value. In this scenario the end-of-perio d market 
price commingles different risk preferences, different endowment s of the risky asset, 
and different private beliefs, along w ith disclosure. Consequently, here it is d ifficult 
to infer conclusively the effect of disclosure on price, sepa rate and apart from all the 
other reasons why participants trade . 
The way around t his problem is to first allow market participants some pnor 
round of trade before disclosure occurs, a nd t hen have a second round when dis-
closure occurs. It is important t o require, however, that in the first round of trade 
market participants anticipate disclosure in t he second round. The advantage of this 
approach is that any price change that results from the second round of trade repre-
sents conclusively the effect of disclosure on prices and price changes. The problem 
is that it is technically very difficult to allow for two rounds of trad e and also satisfy 
all the other rationality criteria discussed above . 
To illustrate some of t hese issues, consider the following p roposal. Let us imagine 
that a prior round of trade in the asset takes place at time T - 1, and the disclosure 
of fj = y occurs at t ime T. In a rational expectations model, investors are expected to 
learn from prices : that is, condition t heir expectations over prices. In two rounds of 
trade, in principle investors at t ime T should be able to condition their expectations 
over prices at both t imes T - 1 and T . But in a rationa l expectations model of 
trade, prices at t imes T- 1 and T could be described as being of the form Pr -1 = 
ar-1 + br-1'fi - dr-1 x and Pr = ar + bru + crff - drx. In addition, as all fixed 
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paramet ers are assumed to be common knowledge in rational trading m odels (i.e., 
ar-1 , ar, br-1, etc.), Pr-1 and Pr represent a system of two simultaneous equations 
in two unknowns, u and x. Consequently, if per-capit a supply is the same at both 
times T- 1 and T (i.e., x = x at bot h t imes T- 1 and T), t hen either Pr-1 and Pr 
- - -fully reveal u and x or Pr-1 and Pr are redundant. The former occurs if Pr-1 and 
- - -Pr are independent equations, while the latter o ccurs if Pr-1 and Pr are dependent 
equations (i.e ., ar-1 = ar , br-1 = br, et c.) . For example, Pr-b~-::_~T- 1 = u- :~=~ x and 
A--aT-cTY = u- ~x. Thus if d T-1 -1- ~ then F _ and F fully reveal u and x. bT bT ' ~ _ 1 I bT T 1 T 
. . d d - -Alternatively, 1f bT-1 = !:I.b then Pr-1 and Pr are redundant. 
T-1 T 
While bot h a fully revealing and price-redunda nt equilibria are possible, depending 
upon investors' conjectures, the advantage of focusing exclusively on t he lat ter is that 
there is lit tle evidence that prices "fully revea l" an asset's value in real institutional 
settings . More significantly, the price-redundant equilibrium can be shown to be the 
generic equilibri um.19 
In t he context of our assumptions, one can show t hat allowing investors to trade 
in a prior period yields the following expression for price at time T - 1 
Pr-1 = 
1 
2 2 (hm + (s + r2s2t) u- (.! + rst) x) . h+s + rst r 
To digress briefly, this expression for Pr-1 is highly reminiscent of the one for price at 
time T in the previous model (model #3) , except for the fact that it does not include 
disclosure (i.e., iJ). In other words, except for disclosure, Pr-1 in this model is the 
same expression as Pr in model # 3 . Despite t he similarity, not e that Pr in m odel 
# 3 results from investors behaving myopically in the sense of failing to ant icipat e 
disclosure at time T; alternatively, Pr -1 in this model evolves endogenously, and zs 
l 9See the discussion in appendix Al of Kim and Verrecchia [1991b]. 
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based on investors rationally anticipating disclosure at time T. Continuing, one can 
show that the price of the asset at time T is 
Consequently, after some algebraic manipulation, I get 
An interpretation of the expression 
is that it is the disclosure "surprise" in price change a nd the ex pression 
is the "noise." 
To digress briefly, the significance of two periods is t hat it allows one to study 
the change in the behav ior of price coincident with a disclosure (e.g., an earnings 
announcement). As for t he assumpt ion that the level of noise is the same in both 
periods (i.e. , x = x in periods T- 1 and T ), recall t hat x represents liquidity and/or 
asset supply shocks . Hence, one could interpret this assumption as suggesting that 
there is a sustained level of liquidity a nd/or supply shock activity surrounding an 
earnings announcement (i.e ., immediately before and after). The primary role of 
this assumption , however, is convenience and transparency; generalizations to more 
complex settings a re straightforward. 20 
Continuing with our discussion of this mo del, note that the DRC is the same in 
both the rational anticipation and non-a nticipation-of-disclosure models , specifically, 
2DSee, for example, He and Wang [1995]. 
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n Despite t his , t he ~%-statistic for the rational anticipation m odel can 
be show n t o be 1. Init ially, this result may seem surprising, but good economic 
intuit ion suggest s why. R ecall that in calculating our ~%-statistic, I hold constant 
the price of t he asset at time T - 1 (i.e., Pr-1). Consequently, if investors t rade 
t o an equilibriwn at t ime T - 1 in anticipation of disclosure a t t ime T, then price 
at tim e T - 1 accounts for all the variability in our model except for disclosure at 
time T . T hus, disclosure at t ime T explains all t he variability of price. In other 
words, the fact t hat the ~%-statistic is 1 points out one of the compelling features of 
the rational-anticipation-of-disclosure model: all the variability in price change arises 
exclusively from disclosure (cont rolling for the behavior of price at timeT - 1). 
Before proceeding to the next mo del, note that a maintained assumption is that 
p rivate information is information about the uncertain asset's value (i.e., Zi = ii + Ei ) 
and not privat e informat ion forecasts of the disclosure (e.g. , zi = y + E:; ). It is 
a straightforward exercise to adapt the model presented here to allow for privat e 
information forecasts of t he disclosure.21 To preserve continuity in our d iscussion , 
however, I stay with t he former. 
Private Information of Heterogeneous Quality (model #5). 22 T he model 
developed t o t his point has many a t tractive features. Invest ors have rational expecta-
t ions in the sense t hat they condit ion their expect ations over prices and in the sense 
that they anticipate the disclosure by establish ing an equilibrium in advance of its 
public d issemination. The problem is that t here is no t rading volume a t t ime T , when 
disclosure occurs . Consequently, one could argue that by insisting on a "conceptually 
correct" model of t rad e, I have lost sight of the objective of the exercise. 
21See Abarbanell et al. [1995] for a paper t hat incorpora tes private information forecasts of future 
disclosure in a model s imilar to the one discussed here. 
22Jn conjunction with model #5, see Kim and Verrecchia [1991a , 1991b]. 
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The reason for t he absence of t rad e is t hat invest ors have what has been d ubbed 
"concordant beliefs," in combination wit h the fact that t he asset a llocation achieved 
in the prior round of tra de (at t ime T- 1) is ex ante Pareto efficient . In m od els 
with these features, public disclosure generates no t rade.23 The intuition underlying 
this result is that a t t im e T - 1 investors achieve asset port folios t hat a lign t heir 
beliefs t o t he pr ice of those assets. Consequent ly, at t ime T , d isclosure shifts price, 
but it p reserves the a lignment because price and invest ors' beliefs m ove in para llel. 
For exa mple, if a n investor 's va luation of what an asset is wort h relative t o the p rice 
at which it sold is some value at t ime T- 1, disclosure at t ime T shifts beliefs and 
prices, but in a fashion t hat preserves t hat value . Consequently, t here is no incentive 
t o trade at time T. 
T his returns us t o the role of two of ou r m aintained assumptions . Homogeneous 
precision of private information across invest ors ensures ex ante Paret o efficiency 
in the prior round of trade and the negative exponent ia l ut ility function ensures 
concordant beliefs . Consequently, if we continue t o maintain t hese a ssumptions, we 
have reached the p rover bia l end-of-t he-road: all our efforts have led us to a world 
in which t here is no role for disclosure. T here is no role for disclosure because t here 
is no incentive t o trad e at time T . If we a re reluctant to a ba ndon the negative 
exponential b ecause of its obvious tractability, one device to ensure that disclosure 
has a role is to assu me that allocations are not ex ante P a reto efficient at t ime T - 1. 
This is achieved by assuming t hat the p recisions of investors ' p rivat e information are 
het erogeneous . For example, it is sufficient to assume t hat there exists some investors 
i a nd j such that the precisions of t heir private information , si and Sj, have t he feat ure 
that si -/= Sj. Consequent ly, henceforth my maintained assumpt ion is t hat for some 
23See, for example, the discussion in M ilgro m and Stokey [1982]; see a lso W ilson [1968]. 
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investors i and j , s; -::fc Sj . 
To d igress briefly, one should be clear about what one is doing here. In general, 
heterogeneous precisions are not a requirement to achieve trade at time T: it simply 
happens that the constant risk tolerance feature of the negative exponential forces 
this requirement. But this means that heterogeneous precisions in conjunction with 
the negative exponential utility function should be interpreted properly as a proxy 
for utility preferences that are more general than the negat ive ex ponential, and not 
a strict requirement for trade, per se. 
The shift from homogeneous to heterogeneous precisions d oes not affect the char-
acterization of price change discussed above in model # 4, provided that one now 
interpret t he expression for s in the previous price change equation a bove as the 
average precision across investors: t hat is , s = limN->=~ 2::; S; . What heteroge-
neous precisions do allow, however, is a cha racterization of trading volume at t ime 
T. Specifically, the (per-capita) trading volume that results when there exists some 
S; -::fc Sj is 
Volume =~ (lim ~ I::r ls;- sl) IPr- Pr-1 1, 2 N--->00 N . 
' 
where, once again, s = lim N->oo ~ 2::; s;. For example, to see the effect of heteroge-
neous precisions, not e that volume is 0 when S; = Sj for all i and j . 24 
In effect, the compelling feature of a model of trade with private information 
of heterogeneous quality is that it results in an expression for trading volume t hat 
24This a lso points up the ma jor difference between Kim and Verrecchia [1991a] and Grundy and 
McNichols [1989], KV and GM, respectively. In GM investors' preannouncement information struc-
ture consists of a common prior and private information with common error and idiosyncratic errors 
w ith identical precision: that is, S i = Sj for all i and j. Alternatively, in KV there is no common 
error, but the idiosyncratic errors have heterogen eous precisions. This expla ins why in GM there 
is no trade in the partially revealing equilibrium: the precisions of all investors are homogeneous. 
For this reason GM focus on the fully-revealing equilibrium (not t he price redunda nt equilibrium 
discussed here) in which investors observe the market price and correct t heir idiosyncratic errors; 
this, in turn, results in tra de. 
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is the product of the average, absolute-va lue difference in the quality of investors' 
private information, i.e., ! ( limN->oo }v L:i rlsi - sl) , and absolute-value price change, 
i.e ., IPr- Pr-1 1· Among other things, this relat ion ex plains the positive association 
between trading volume and absolut e value price change commonly cited in the lit-
erature.25 The relation itself is very intuit ive in that it suggests that t rading volume 
is the product of the extent to which investors h old diverse opinions at an idiosyn-
cratic level through their heterogeneous, privat e precis ion si weights, and the extent 
t o which these opinions change on average at t he time of disclosure t hrough Pr-Pr-1· 
But, as I discuss below , a problem rem ains . 
Heterogeneous Interpretations of a Common Disclosure (model #6). 26 
A maintained assumption throughout the analysis has been that investors inter-
p ret disclosure in some common fashion. One artifact of common interpretations 
of disclosure is t hat the characterizat ion for t rading volume implied by the previous 
equation suggests that volume is rela t ed to absolute value price change through the 
coefficient ! (~ L:i rlsi - sl), but with a zero intercept. For exa mple, Volume = 
a + fJ IPr- Pr-1 1, where (3 =! (~ L:; rlsi - sl) and a = 0. 
A zero intercept implies that t rading volume cannot a rise in the absence of price 
change. B ut this rela tion has been criticized by t hose who claim t hat empirically 
volume arises even in the absence of price change.27 So t he q uestion now is: how 
might one extend t he model further t o address this concern? In other words, how 
might it be possible t o characterize t rad ing volume in the absence of price changes? 
One way to extend the model to incorporat e t he possibility of volume even in 
the absence of price changes is to allow investors t o int erpret disclosure diversely. 
25See, for example, Karp off [1 987). 
26Jn conjunction with model #6, see Dontoh and Ronen [1993), Harris a nd Raviv [1995), Ka ndel 
and Pearson [1995), and Kim and Verrecchia [1997). 
27See Ka ndel and Pearson [1995). 
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Account ing research has long debated t he extent t o wh ich disclosure is int erpreted 
similarly versus dissimila rly by market part icipants, and in the accounting lit era -
ture there exists many characterizations of a common d isclosure being interpreted 
diversely.28 To incorporate t hat possibility of diverse interpret ations, first recall that 
fj = u + fj. Suppose that in addition to privat e information a bout u directly t hrough 
Zi, investors also possess private information about fj, in the form of 0 ; = fj - Wi, 
where the w;'s have a normal distribution wit h m ean 0 and p recisions wi . Institution-
ally, Oi can be thought of as the information an investor glea ns by studying the error 
in disclosures, where the error arises from t he applicat ion of random, liberal, or con-
servative accrual-based accounting practices and estimates . When there is d isclosure, 
this informat ion can t hen be used t o partia lly correct for the error. 
When diverse interpretat ions of a common d isclosure are added to our previous 
assumptions, expected trading volume can be represented now by 
1 1 
E [Volume iu , Pr, Pr -1 ] =- lim - I: r l(w; - w )(u - Pr ) + (s; - s)(Pr-1- Pr) I+R , 
2N--->ooN . 
' 
where R is a (positive) residual term.29 For example, consider the case where t here 
is no price change, t hat is , Pr = Pr-1· For this m odel specification expected t rad ing 
volume arises despite the absence of p rice changes. Specifically, when Pr = Pr-1 
expect ed volume reduces t o 
1 1 
E [Volumeiu, Pr,Pr-1] =-lim - I:r i(wi -w)(u -Pr)l + R , 2 N --->00 N . 
1 
an expression t hat is always positive. In short, this model suggest s how volume 
may arise in t he a bsence of price cha nges. It must be acknowledged, of course, that 
while this m odel characterizes t rading volume in the absence of price changes, it lacks 
28See, for example, discussions in Holtha usen and Verrecchia [1990], Indjejikia n [1991], and Kim and 
Verrecchia [1994] . 
29See the discussion on pp. 408-413 of Kim and Verrecchia [1997]. 
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the more transparent and elegant relation between price change and trading volume 
suggest ed in model # 5, Volume = ! (lim N-;co }v I:i r lsi - sl) IPr- Pr-1 1· Suffice it 
t o say that at this juncture the specification for t he relation between price change 
and volume in model #5 is a benchmark routinely used in empirical studies.30 
To summa rize our efforts t o this point, so far many elements of rationality and 
investor diversity have been incorporat ed into the analysis. But it could be argued 
also that whatever has been accomplished has only been at t he expense of a very 
parochial view of "investor diversity." Therefore, I explore t his issue in the next 
section. 
Heuristic Behavior (model #7).31 A maintained assumption throughout our 
analysis has been that all investor agents who participate in the market use whatever 
information is at their disposal, either privat e or p ublic, in accordance with Bayes 
rule. But is this reasona ble? Does this superimpose onto the analysis an element of 
rationality that no one would expect each and every investor agent to a chieve in all 
cases? In theory-based, economic analyses, reliance on Bayes rule is so routinized an 
assumption as rarely to warrant a ny justification. The compelling feat u re of Bayes 
rule is that it implies the most efficient use of information. Consequently, in market 
settings, investors who use information more efficiently (i.e., Bayesians) should be 
ab le t o exploit and d ominate their less efficient counterparts . In a ddition, even if 
this were not the case , it could be a rgued that B ayesian behav ior captures well the 
behavior of market participants at an aggregate level, where indiv idual, idiosyncratic 
departures from Bayes rule cancel out "on average." In other words, while strict 
reliance on Bayes rule by everyone may seem a lit tle far-fetched , one might expect 
that behaviors averaged over many people approximat e Bayesian behav ior. 
30See , for example, At iase and Bamber [1994]. 
31Jn conjunction with model # 7, see DeLong, et al. [1990]. 
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Recent ly, however, a fashionable element of cont emporary research in finance has 
allied itself with studies in the psychology literature, and called into question the 
degree t o which markets participants adhere to Bayes rule in real market sett ings.32 
The Bayes-rule-doubters point to the wealt h of empirical evidence that market prices 
sometimes appear to overreact to events, and sometimes underreact (e.g., the post-
announcement drift phenomenon). While there may be a host of reasons why markets 
behave in ways that defy rational economic analysis, investors' inability t o apply 
correctly Bayes rule explains all manner of anomalous behavior. Consequently, this 
may be an opportune time t o assess the role of this assumpt ion. 
The major difficulty with substituting some heuristic use of information for Bayes 
rule is that potentially it explains everything, which, in turn, suggests that it explains 
nothing . For example, price underreactions are explained easily by a class of invest ors 
who are anchored to their prior beliefs. Alternatively, overreactions are explained 
easily by a class of investors who place more weight on the m ost recent information 
stimulus than can be justified under Bayes Rule. In this env ironment , what "ground 
rules" should we require in exploring the possibility of heuristic behaviors? I argue 
that one rule should be that a heuristic behavior be survivable. There are market 
settings where this can happen. That is, in some market settings there may be 
advantages t o heuristic behaviors that offset t he fact t hat failure t o adhere t o Ba yes 
rule means that heuristic investors use information less efficiently t han their Bayesian 
counterparts (on average) . But in the absence of demonstrating conclusively that a 
heuristic behavior can su rvive in competition against Ba yes rule, the sa fest course may 
be t o continue t o assume that market participants use information in accordance with 
Bayes rule. 
32See , for example, Thaler [1993]. 
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To illustrate some of these points in the context of our discussion, let me return 
t o model #4 to incorporate the possibility of some measurable set of investors be-
having heuristically. As t he development of t he following model is somewhat longer 
than those already discussed, let me briefly point out its motivation. First, it demon-
strates that it is difficult to reconcile heuristic behavior with surv iva bility in m odels 
of perfect competition. Second, it is useful for simply illustrating issues related to 
the introduction of heuristic behavior into models of (otherwise rational) trad e. 
To start, imagine an economy in which a fraction 1r of invest ors are heuristic and a 
fraction 1-'lf are Bayesians, where 0 < 1r < 1. To keep the discussion simple, I assume 
that neither type possesses a ny private information and each is equivalently endowed: 
that is, s = 0, and X ; x and b; = b for all investors i. As purely a m odeling element , 
the introduction of heuristic behavior introduces subtle issues concerning the extent 
to which heuristic investors are rational (and/ or B ayesian) versus the extent to which 
they are heur ist ic. Specifically, in the cont ext of rational models of trade, heuristic 
behavior presupposes some element of schizophrenia on the part of heuristic investors 
in that it requires that they combine some elements of rational (and/ or Bayesian) 
behavior along with some elements of heuristic behavior. T o address these issues and 
for the sake of simplicity, I assume that heuristic investors are rational/Bayesia n in 
all regards except for the fact that based on a d isclosure y, the B ayesian investor's 
expect ation of firm va lue is E [u ly] = m + h:n (y - m), which is the correct statistical 
valuation, whereas the heuristic invest or's expectation of firm value is EH [uly] = 
m + h:n (y - m). This characterization of heuristic behav ior suggests t hat when 
() > 1 heuristic investors "overreact" t o the disclosure relative t o the unconditional 
mean of u, which is m, whereas () < 1 suggests that they "underreact." D espit e 
the potential over- or underreaction on the part of heuristic investors , I assume that 
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both t ypes continue to assess posterior variances correctly: t hat is, for both invest or 
t ypes V AR[uiy] = (h + n)- 1 . Let me emphasize that this characterization of heuristic 
behavior is only one of many possible ways to illustrate non-Bayesian behavior. 
Using model #4 as a benchmark and assuming s = 0, one can show that the 
price for t he asset at t ime T - 1 is Pr-1 = m - r~ x and at t ime T is Pr = 
h~n (hm + nfj + nn [fj - m ] [B- 1] - ~x) , a nd, hence, t he expression for price change 
l S 
Pr- Pr-1 = _ n _ ((nB + 1- n)(fj - m) + ~x) . 
h + n rh 
Here the DRC is h : n (nB + 1- n) . Moreover, t he DRC is greater t han (less than) 
the coefficient with exclusively Bayesian investors when B > ( <) 1. In other words, 
if heuristic traders "overreact" ( ''underreact") to the disclosure, price change will be 
more (less) reliant on disclosure. 
The only problem with this model as a characterization of heuristic behavior is 
that because the market is perfectly competitive, heuristic investors will a lways do 
worse t han Bayesian invest ors. F irst I show this and then I discuss the intuition 
underlying this observation. Using the analysis int roduced previously, a heuristic 
investor's demand for the asset is 
EH [uiy]- Pr 
D H = r n l = -rn (1- n) (1- B) (y- m) +X. VARuy 
In comparing this expression for demand to the one derived above in model # 4, note 
that one implication of the assumption that s = 0 is t hat investors no longer bene-
fit from conditioning t heir expectations over price because price does not aggregate 
private information. Alternatively, a Bayesian invest or's demand for the asset is 
E [uiy] - Pr 
D B = r VAR [uiy] = rnn (1- B) (y - m) + x. 
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As a check that t hese demand characterizations are correct, not e that n DH+(1- n ) DB = 
x, which is what one would expect: total per-capita demand equals total per-capita 
supply. 
Now consider the respective expected utilities of t he heuristic and Bayesian in-
vestors at timeT. Regardless of how the heurist ic invest or evaluates t he disclosure y, 
the correct statistical valuation of u cond itional on y is E [uJy]. This implies t hat based 
on a disclosure of y, the heuristic investor's expected utility (correctly evaluated) is 
E[U (DH (u- Pr) + xPr + b) Jy] 
1 1 2 1 1 1 
- exp [-;-DHE[iiJy] + 2r 2 DH VAR[iiJy] + ;-DHPT- ;-xPr- ;-b], 
whereas a Bayesian investor's expected utility is 
E [U (D B(ii - Pr) + xPr + b) Jy] 
1 12 - 1 1 1 
- exp[- ;-DBE[ii Jy] + 2r 2 D BVAR[uJy] +;-DEPT- -:;:xPr- -:;:b]. 
A Bayesian investor's expected utility is higher than that of a heuristic investor if the 
argument in t he exponential of a Bayesian invest or's expected ut ilit y is lower t han 
that of a heurist ic investor, which happens if 
this inequality can be reex pressed as 
Not e, however, t hat 
- 1 ( 2 2) -1 1 n 2 2 2 (E [u Jy] -Pr)(D B -DH)+ - DH-DB (h+n) = -r-- (1- 61 ) (y- m ) , 
2r 2 h + n 
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and the ex pression ~r h:zn (1- 0)2 (y - m)2 is positive for all y # m and e # 1. But 
this implies that heuristic investors always do worse than Bayesian invest ors, and 
hence are unlikely t o surv ive. 
The int uit ion underly ing this result is that in a perfectly competitive market no 
single invest or's actions or dem a nds a ffect price. In addition , Bayesian investors make 
statistically correct portfolio rebalancing decisions (on average) in t he presence of 
disclosure, whereas heuristic invest ors make inferior portfolio rebalancing decisions. 
Consequently, over time Bayesian behavior should out perform heuristic behav iors , 
and , for this reason, presumably drive heuristic behaviors from t he market. Of course, 
one device t o ensure the survival of heurist ic traders is t o assume t hat these investors 
have private information that is superior t o the information available t o Bayesian 
invest ors. In t his case the inferior use of information by heuristic traders is offset by 
their superior information. But endowing heur istic investors with superior privat e 
information is a bit of a dodge. The interesting question is : can they survive w hen 
they are as well informed as Bayesians? 
Imperfect Competition (model #8).33 W hile the result that heuristic behav-
ior will not survive is certainly nice and tidy, it may be t hat the failure t o demonstrat e 
survivability is not a consequence of heuristic b ehavior, per se, but rather the fact 
that markets are assumed to be perfectly competit ive. T o explore t his issue, first I 
digress and consider the alterna tive of imperfect competition. 
A maintained assumption t hroughout the analysis is that m arkets are perfectly 
competitive. Markets may not be perfectly competitive, however, when t he actions of 
some investors do indeed affect the price at which their trades are executed. O ne way 
t o rationa lize the possibility of an investor's actions affecting price instit utionally is 
33Jn conjun ction with model #8, see Kyle [1985], Admati and Pfleiderer [1988a], Kyle [1989], Kim 
and Verrecchia [1994], Trueman and McNichols [1994], and Marzano [1999]. 
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t o imagine that t he investor agents are large inst itut ional tra ders whose actions drive 
markets . For example, imagine that the market is comprised of a large institutional 
investor and "the market," which represents, in effect, everyone else. For convenience, 
henceforth I assume t hat both t he investor and ''the market" are risk-neutral, with 
a ut ility for a n amount of a consumable good g given by U (g ) = g. 34 I continue to 
represent disclosure as fj = u + ij , but now assume that the large instit utiona l invest or 
(the investor, henceforth ) knows ij = 71 · As discussed in the context of mod el # 6, a 
justification for knowing 71 is that the investor studies t he firm's accounting practices 
and procedures well enough to understand t he errors in disclosures that a rise from the 
applicat ion of random, liberal, or conservative accrual-based account ing . Knowledge 
of ij = 71 in combination with fj imp lies that the invest or knows u, t he value of the 
firm. Alternatively, I assume t hat ''the market" is not as astute about accounting 
practices and procedures as the invest or, and consequently only knows fj . 
Imperfect competit ion implies that t he investor knows that his actions will have 
an effect on the market price at which his trades a re executed , a nd t akes that into 
consideration in submitting demand orders. Consequently, the investor and ''the 
market" play the following game. First, the investor determines the demand order he 
wants execut ed based on his knowledge of u. Then t his dema nd order gets "ba tched" 
with the demand orders genera ted from random shocks in the supply of the asset, x. 
Fina lly, "the market" executes this combined dema nd order at a single price. 
Let d represent t he demand order of the investor, D = d + x the t otal or combined 
demand orders of the investor a nd random supply shocks, and P t he price set by ''the 
34W hile it would be a straightforward exercise to preserve t he assumption t hat all agents have a 
u t ility for a consumable good represented by the negative exponential utility function a nd offer a 
d iscussion = nsist ent w ith prior models, risk neutrality is a common assumption in the literature that 
this modeling v ignet te characterizes. C onsequently, hencefort h my maintained assumption about 
u t ility preferences is t hat all m arket agents are risk neutral. 
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market" for executing orders.35 I assume that competition to execute demand orders 
forces demand orders to be executed at a price that reflects t he expected value of the 
asset conditional on what ''the market" knows at the t ime the order is executed. At 
the time the order is executed, ''the market " knows f; and the total demand order D. 
This implies that P = E [ulf;, D]. The investor moves first in this game, and therefore 
must make some assumption about how "the market" will interpret a demand order 
of a particular size. I assume that the investor conjectures that the price set by ''the 
market" based on a disclosure y and the submission of a total demand order D is 
P=m+ f3 (y -m)+>-.D. 
In effect, t he price is a linear function of y and D. Once again, the coefficient {3 is the 
DRC, while ).. is commonly interpreted as market depth. 
The play of the t rading game can be summarized through a series of chronological 
steps . 
1) Firm value is realized; this is represented by u = u . 
2) The variable f; = y is disclosed and the investor observes i/ = 'f] . 
3) The investor submits a demand order to ''the market," which is combined with 
random supply shocks represented by x = x . 
4) Based on the total demand order, ''the market" sets the price at which trades 
are executed (i .e ., ''the market" picks P equal to the firm's expected value cond itional 
on d isclosure and tot al demand). All trades are then executed at that price. 
5) The firm is liquidat ed, paying out a return to shareholders of u . 
The equilibrium to this game could be thought to arise from steps 3) and 4), 
each of which is self-serving on the part of the indiv idual who executes the step. For 
35For notational convenience, henceforth I drop the "T " subscript in making reference to price: m 
effect, all subsequent models are treated as exclusively one-period models of trade. 
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example, in step 3) the invest or det ermines his demand order d by solving 
maxd · E [u- P Ju = u , y = y], 
d 
where he conjectures t hat P = m + {3 (Y - m ) + >.D. T his implies that he solves 
max d · E [u- m - {3(y - m) - >.(d + x) Ju = u, y = y], 
d 
which, in t urn, implies 
1 
d = - ( u - m - {3 [y - m]) . 
2).. 
A consequence of the investor's choice of d is t hat u, y, and D = d +x have a t rivariate 
normal distribution with means of (m, m, 0) and a covariance matrix given by 
2~h-1 (1- /3 ) 
L (h-1 - !3[h-1 + n-1 ]) 
In step 4) "the market" sets P conditiona l on the disclosure and the t otal demand 
order received. The covariance matrix given ab ove implies that this results in the 
following relation 
Note, however, that for the investor's original conjecture about {3 and ).. to be fulfilled, 
. b h h {3 4A.z n +t,6 d ' 2A.t Th" . . I" 1t must e t e case t at = 4 A.2n+t + 4A.2h , an " = 4A.2n +t+ 4 A.2h. 1s, 1n turn, 1mp 1es 
(3 = h:n and ).. = ~~- In short, a self-fulfilling equilibrium is one in which the 
p rice at which demand orders are executed is given by 
n 1{,±;; P = m + --(y - m) + - --D, h + n 2 h + n 
where h:n is the DRC and ~~is market depth, respectively. 
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From a disclosure perspective, this equilibrium has a number of int erest ing fea-
tures. First, unlike a model of perfect competition , t he investor does not go infinitely 
long or infinit ely short in t he asset, even though he knows t he asset's value (i.e ., 
the investor knows u = u). The reason for t his is that he must t ake into consider-
ation t he effect of his demand order on the price at which his demand order will be 
executed. The larger his demand order (i.e. , the larger d), the more he expects it 
will cost to execute that order (i.e., the higher E [P]). For example, because ,.\ > 0, 
when tot al demand is positive (i.e., D > 0) t he investor has his t rades executed at 
a higher p rice than t hat implied by "the market" knowing exclusively the disclo-
sure y (i.e. , P = m + h:n(Y - m)). Another feature of his demand order, as well 
as the total demand order, is that it is uncorrelated with the d isclosure : t hat is, 
E [(y - m ) d] = E[(y - m) D] = 0 . The intuition underlying this result is that the in-
-
vestor knows y when he submits his demand order d, and knows that t he information 
content of y will be fully priced in P when his demand order is executed because y is 
public information. Consequently, he adjust s his demand order to t ake int o account 
the effect of the disclosure on price, which is tantamount to ensuring t hat his demand 
order and the disclosure are uncorrelated. Finally, note that the DRC in t his model 
is identical to the one that arose in the context of our model # 1, a situation in which 
the only information in t he economy was the information that arose d irectly from 
disclosure. The int uition for this is t he DRC captures the effect of d isclosure, while 
the coefficient on the tot al demand , ..\, captures the incremental knowledge t hat arises 
from observing total demand , D, in addition to t he disclosure. 
Heuristic Behavior Revisited (model #9).36 Having laid out t he notion of 
imperfect competit ion, now I revisit heuristic behavior in the context of a model of 
36Jn conjunction with model #9, see Pala mino (1996], Kyle a nd Wang [1997], and Fischer and 
Verrecchia [1 999]. 
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this type. What I hope to show here is that when heuristic behavior is combined 
with imperfect competition, there is a possibility of a heuristic trader surviving in 
competition with a (rational) Bayesian investor. The rationale for this is that when 
an investor's actions affect price, placing more weight on disclosure than that implied 
by Bayes rule will drive prices in t he direction of the disclosure. For example, in the 
presence of "good news," a heuristic investor who places more weight on disclosure 
than that implied by Bayes rule will drive prices up further on "good news" than 
could otherwise be justified by "correct" (i.e., Bayesian) valuation. But a (ra tional) 
Bayesian investor, knowing this, will reduce his demand because he seeks to avoid 
paymg a price for the asset beyond the one implied by correct valuat ion. But in 
"backing off" part of his demand, a Bayesian, in turn, reduces price through his 
actions, and this accommodation t o heuristic behavior allows heuristic t raders t o 
pay less for their greater share of the asset tha n they would otherwise be able to 
achieve. Consequently, even though heuristic traders use disclosure less capably than 
Bayesians, Ba yesians may accommodat e heuristic traders in a fashion that result s in 
their heuristic motivated tra nsactions being executed at more favorable prices. Here, 
it may be possible for heuristic and Bayesian investors to bot h survive, prov ided that 
the accommodation afforded by the latter perfectly offsets t he decreased capabilities 
of the former as users of information. 
To illustrate t his point, consider an economy inhabited by two "large" instit utional 
investors, one of whom is Bayesian and the other of whom is heuristic. By "large," I 
mean that both invest ors have t olerances for risk, financial resources, and/ or reputa -
tions that enable them to take very significant positions in the market. In addit ion, 
as a by-product of being "la rge," I assume that bot h investor types a re risk-neutra l. 
The very significant positions t hese large investors take will, in turn, affect the price 
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at which they transact. For example, based on a disclosure of y , I assume that the 
price at which either large investor w ill have his or her trades for the asset executed 
l S 
where /3 and A are fixed, positive coefficients, and dH and dB represent the demands 
of the heuristic and Bayesian investors, respectively. The /3 coefficient can be inter-
preted as the (exogenously specified) DRC and the A co efficient can be interpreted 
as the sensitivity of the demands of the two large traders on the price at which all 
transactions are executed: in effect, market depth. For example, the latter implies 
that as A increases, the price at which trades for the asset are executed increases 
when ''large investor" net demand for t he asset is positive (i.e., dH +dB > 0), and 
decreases when "large investor" net demand for the asset is negative. 
Recall that based on a disclosure y, the Bayesian investor's expectation of firm 
value is E [uly] = m + h:n (y- m) and the heuristic investor's expectation of firm 
value is EH[uly] = m + h:ne (y- m). As the heuristic investor values the firm at 
E H [uly] based on the disclosure and must pay a price P , he chooses dH to maximize 
the following objective function 
This function is concave and maximized at 
1 
dH = 2A (EH [u ly ]- m - /3 (y - m)- AdB)· 
Similarly, the Bayesian investor's choice of dB is optimal at 
dB = ~(E [u i y] - m - {3 (y - m) - AdH ). 2A 
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Solving for dH and dB, in equilibrium the heuristic and Bayesian investors choose, 
respectively, 
~ (2EH[iiJy] - E [ii Jy] - m- {3 (y - m )), and 
3). 
1 
3,\ (2E [ii Jy]- EH [ii Jy] - m- f3 (y - m )) . 
This, in turn, implies that in equilibrium 
P m + f3 (y-m) + >.(dH + dB) 
k (m + f3 (y- m) + EH[ii Jy] + E [ii Jy]) . 
Now consider the respective expected utilities of t he heuristic and Bayesian in-
vestors. Regardless of how the heuristic investor evaluates the disclosure y , once 
again t he correct statistical va luation of ii conditional on y is E [ii Jy]. This implies 
that based on a disclosure of y, the heuristic investor's expected utility (correctly 
evaluated) for having his trade executed is EU H (y) = dH (E[iiJy] - P), whereas the 
Bayesian investor's expected utility is EU B (y) = dB (E[ii Jy] - P ) . Consequently, 
here the difference in the respective expected utilit ies of the heurist ic and Bayesian 
invest ors can be shown to be 
EUH (y)- EUB (Y) 
3\ (EH[iiJy] - E [iiJy]) (2E[ii Jy] - EH[iiJy] - m - f3 (y - m)) 
~ (-n-) (8- 1) (-n- (2- B) - f3) (y - m )2 . 3). h + n h + n 
This expression is concave in() and equals 0 at two points: () = 1 and() = 2 - ( h:n) {3. 
Assume that 2- ( h:n) {3 > 1. This implies t hat for any() in the interval [1 , 2- ( h:n) {3] 
t he heuristic invest or does better than t he Bayesian investor. Similarly, assume 2 -
( h:n) f3 < 1. T his implies t hat for any() in the interval [2 - ( h:n) {3, 1] the heuristic 
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investor also does bett er. In other words, as long as there is some interval between 1 
and 2 - ( h~n) (3, and () is in that interval, the heuristic investor will outperform the 
Bayesian on average. In particular, note that when() = 2- ( h~n ) (3 -::/= 1, the heuristic 
investor is not Bayesian and yet both do equally well. 
In addition, note that a() above 1 implies that the heuristic investor "overreacts" to 
the disclosure, while a B below 1 implies that a heuristic investor "underreacts" to the 
disclosure. Consequently, there exist "overreacting'' and "underreacting" behaviors 
for which the heuristic invest or does better t han the Bayesian investor, despite the fact 
that the heuristic investor's valuation of the asset (i.e., u) conditional on disclosure 
(i.e., y) is inferior to that of the Bayesian (on average), and bot h pay an identical 
price for buying and selling the asset. 
Before I conclude, however, note the role of the DRC. In the d iscussion of the 
previous model (model #8) I showed t hat the DRC on any public disclosure was 
(3 = h:n. But (3 = h:n' implies 2- ( h~n) (3 = 1, which, in t urn, implies that the 
only value for () at which the heuristic investor does no worse than the Bayesian is 
at B = 1. What is the significance of this? Well, one could int erpret a DRC of h:n 
as one in which "the market" is Bayesian on average, because from our discussion of 
model #8 we know that h:n is the correct (i.e., Bayesian) coefficient on price. And 
when ''the market" as a whole is Bayesian, the Bayesian investor always outperforms 
the heuristic investor, absent the case in which B = 1, where the heuristic investor 
does equally well. But () = 1 implies that the heuristic investor is actually Bayesian! 
So t he moral of the story is simple . When "the market" is Bayesian on average, 
a heuristic (i.e., non-Bayesian) investor will always be outperformed by a Bayesian 
investor. 
In short, the provocative feature of this model, in conjunction with model #7, is 
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that it suggests that heurist ic behavior is not survivable in either a perfectly compet -
it ive or imperfectly competit ive market, provided t hat, in t he case of the latter, ''the 
market" is Bayesian on average. 
Conditioning Beliefs over Trading Volume (model #10).37 To conclud e 
this essay, I consider t he role of one last mainta ined a ssumption. In all t he mod els 
discussed up to t his p oint, investor agents who participat e in the market, eit her as 
invest ors or m arket makers, cond ition their expectations exclusively over t otal net 
demand , either ind irectly through t he m arket price (see, for example, models # 3-6) 
or d irectly as in "the market" cond itioning its expectat ions over t ot a l net demand 
(see, for example, mod el #8) . T h is raises t he question as t o whether investors and/or 
''the market " would benefit from conditioning their expectat ions over ot her variables, 
like t rading volume, and how t his would change various m arket cha racterizat ions .38 
To understand some of the issues involved in including t rading volume as a condi-
t ioning variable , I offer a very sim ple model in w hich t his is achieved . In an att empt 
t o mainta in as facile an ex position as possible, I emphasize tha t I chose the sim-
plest set of assumptions tha t a re st ill sufficient ly rob ust t o capt ure the p roblem.39 
Extensions of this simple model t o more general settings should b e stra ightforward . 
37In conjunction with model #10, see Kim a nd Verrecchia [2001]; see also Glost en and M ilgrom 
[1985] and K yle [1985]. 
38Prior work on t rading volume as a source of information includes Blume, et al. [1994] , wh o 
propose a model of p erfect competit ion in wh ich market pa rticipants condition t heir expectations 
over d emand a nd trading volume informat ion from the prior period (as well as their own current 
period's private information) and Cam pbell, et al. [1993], who propose a m odel in which t rading 
volume commun icates cha nges in the dema nd for a n asset by noninformat iona l tra ders . Note that in 
the case of t he latter , t he trading activity of noninforma tional t raders arises from t ransitory shifts 
in their t astes and preferences for a n a sset, a nd not information tha t is in any way superior or 
d issimilar t o public knowledge. 
39Sp ecifically, t he assumptions underlying t his model are a commingling of id eas from G losten and 
M ilgrom [1985] (GM) and K yle [1985], but is unique in t he way it combines those element s. For 
example, as in GM, I assume t ha t t ra de in t he asset is limited to a single unit (i.e., buy one unit or 
sell one unit) , bu t , as in subsequ ent ex tensions of their work (i.e, Dia mond a nd Verrecchia [1987]) 
also allow for t he possibility that t rade is deferred (i.e ., n eit her buy nor sell) . In addition , as in both 
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To sta rt, recall t hat t he uncertain firm value is represented by ii and has a normal 
distribution with mean 0 and precision h (i.e ., t he reciprocal of variance) . Let F(u) 
represent the cumulat ive probability distribution of realizations of ii and f (u) its 
density function. This implies that f (u) = ~ exp[ -~h (u)2 ] . Now imagine an econ-
omy with N market participants, one of whom is a "large," risk neutral, informed 
investor. The informed investor observes ii = u (i.e., as in model #8 he knows firm 
value) and attempts to trade on t he information . Specifically, conditional on u , the 
informed investor submits a demand order of either 1, 0, or -1. In the context of 
our model, a demand order of 0 implies that an investor defers trade. There are 
also N - 1 uninformed or liquidity traders, each of whom independent ly submits a 
demand order of either 1, 0, or -1. The probabilit y of an indiv idual liquidity trader 
submitting a demand order of 0 is x E (0, 1) , and the probabilit y of submitt ing an 
order of either 1 or - 1 is ~ (1 - x ). With the exception of knowledge of u and the 
identity of the informed investor, every feat ure of the economy is common knowledge. 
As in model #8, the existence of a large informed investor suggests a model of 
imperfect competit ion in which the following game is played between t he informed 
investor and "the market." Let D and V represent total net demand and total t rad ing 
volume, respectively, and P the price at w h ich trades are executed by "the market 
maker." Play can be summarized through a series of chronological st eps . 
1) Firm value is realized; this is represented by ii = u. 
2) The informed investor observes ii = u . 
GM and Kyle, I a ssume that all trades are executed by a risk neutral m arket maker who operates 
in an env ironment of perfect competition. Unlike, however, either GM, who assumes that trades are 
executed sequentially, or Kyle, w ho assumes that trades are executed based on total net demand, 
I assume that trades, and prices at which those trades are executed, are based on order flow over 
some interval of time. In this context, order-flow information is equivalent to information on bot h 
total net demand a nd trading volume. Through this dev ice, a sset returns in this model depend on 
tra ding volume information (among other t hings) . 
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3) The (risk-neutral) informed investor and uninformed traders submit demand 
orders to "the market." 
4) Based on knowledge of total net demand and total trading volume that results 
from these demand orders, "the (risk-neutral) market" sets t he price at which trades 
are executed (i.e., "the market" picks P equal to the firm's expected value conditional 
on D and V). All t rades are then executed at that price. 
5) The firm is liquidat ed, paying out a return to shareholders of u . 
As described above, this game is obviously reminiscent of model # 8. It differs , 
however, in one important way : here "the market" condit ions over two sou rces of 
information. Specifically, "the market" also conditions over total trading volume in 
addition to total net demand. More broadly, one can interpret "the market" in our 
analysis as a st ylization of a market process in which the market price of firm shares 
reacts to contemporaneous demand and volume information.40 To explain briefly 
those inferences that result from conditioning expectat ions over demand and volume. 
Suppose that there are M informed investors. In addition, let N denote the total 
number of market participants: that is, N = M + L. Finally, let N+, N °, and 
N - denote the exact numbers of each of the submitted demand orders 1, 0, and 
-1. The informational benefit of observ ing V in addition t o D is that "the market" 
can infer the exact numbers of each of the submitted demand orders 1, 0, and - 1. 
For exa mple, it is straightforward exercise to verify that N +, N °, and N - can be 
40The salient feature of t his model is that "the market" conditions its expectations over contem -
poran eous trading volume information, in conjunction with contemporaneous information on total 
net demand. An alternative approach to the one suggested here is Blume, et al. [1994], which is 
based on Hellwig's [1982] model of perfect compet ion in which information about total net demand 
(through price) is learned in a subsequent period . In effect, in Blume, et al. m arket part icipants 
condition their expectations over the prior period's demand and volume information. 
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determined t hrough knowledge of D and V as follows 
N + = _V_+_D_ 
2 ' 
V-D 
N - =---
2 
N° = N -V. 
Alternatively, D alone only reveals the difference b etween t he number of buy orders 
and the number of sell orders. In short, knowledge of demand and volume is a finer 
pa rt ition of information than demand alone, and hence should result in more precise 
inferences. 
Returning t o the game, the informed investor submits a demand order without 
knowing the price at which his trade will be execut ed. Let d represent t he informed 
investor's demand order a nd P the price at which trades a re executed. T he informed 
investor chooses d so as to maximize his expected p rofit based on the effect t hat his 
action has on the expected price at which t rades are executed 
d = Arg max d (u - E [F id]) . 
Let A be some element on R +, the posit ive ha lf-real line. Note that t he informed in-
vestor 's t rading rule or strategy can b e completely characterized by A, in the following 
fashion. The informed investor chooses d = 1 for all u ;::=: A such that A = E [F id = 1]; 
he chooses d = -1 for a ll u ::;; -A such t hat -A = E [Fid = -1] ; and he chooses 
d = 0 for a ll u E (-A , A). This implies t ha t based on t his strategy, the probabilities 
that the informed investor submit s demand orders of d = 1, d = -1, and d = 0 are 
1 - F (A), F (- A), and F (A) - F (-A), respectively. 
Our search for an equilibrium t o this trading game is limited to one t hat fulfills 
the following conjecture on t he part of "the market" : t here exists a A E R + such that 
when the informed investor observes a value of u ;::=: A, t hen he submits a demand 
A A 
order of 1; when the informed investor observes a value of u between - A and A, t hen 
he submits an order of 0 ; and, fina lly, when t he informed investor observes a value of 
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u ..::; - >., then he submits an order of -1. Because of symmetry, all the results with 
,.\are true with ->., with appropriate changes in sign. For this reason, we only show 
and prove our results with ,.\ ~ 0. 
An equilibrium to this game is characterized as follows: 
i} ''the market " chooses P after observing D and V based on its conjecture 
that t he informed invest or uses ,.\ in choosing his tra ding rule; 
ii) anticipating ''the market's" behavior, the informed investor chooses a 
trading rule characterized by >.; 
iii} in equilibrium, ). = ,.\ ( ''the market " correctly anticipates the informed 
invest or's t rading rule) . 
Now let M = 1, which implies N = 1 + L. When ''the market" observes net 
demand, D, and volume, V, it can infer the number of each of the 1, 0, and -1 
demand orders. The joint probabilities of the informed demand being 1, 0, and -1 
and a { D , V} pair a re, respectively, 
(N - 1)! 1- X V-1 N -V 
Pr(d = 1, D , V) = (1- F (>.)) · (V+D ) ( ) (V-D) (--) x 
-- - 1' N - V' -- ' 2 2 . . 2 . 
for V > -D, and Pr(d = 1) = 0 for V = -D; 
(N - 1) ' 1- X Pr(d- 0 D V) - (F(>.)- F (->.)) . · (--)v x N - V - 1 
- ' ' - (V;D)!(N - V- 1)!(V2D)! 2 
for V < N , and Pr(d = 0) = 0 for V = N ; 
(N - 1) ! 1 - X V-1 N-V 
Pr(d = -1, D , V) = F(->.) · (v ; D)!(N _ V)!(v;D _ 1)! (- 2-) x 
for V > D, and Pr(d = -1) = 0 for V =D. 
Let P(D, V : x , >.), or more simply P(D, V), be the market maker's expectation 
of u after observing D and V, given x and a conjecture >.. 41 From t he above relations, 
41 
54 
one can show that t he price chosen by "t he market" on the basis of a {D,V} pair ca n 
be characterized as 
P (D ,V) E [u iD,V] 
E [u lu ~ >.] 
Pr(d = 1, D , V) · (1) + Pr(d = 0, D, V ) · (0) + Pr(d = -1, D , V ) · ( -1) 
x--~--~~~~~~~~~----~~~~~----~~~~--~ Pr(d = 1, D , V) + Pr(d = 0, D , V) + Pr(d = -1, D, V ) 
E [u lu ~ >.] · (1- F (>.))x(v;n - v2n ) 
(1- F (>.))x(v;D + V2D ) + (F (>.) - F ( ->.)) C;x)(N - V ) 
E [u lu ~ >.] · (~ ) 
[ 
( N - v ) {X + 1 - 2F ().)} l 
X 
1 
+ V { x + 1 - 2F ().)} + N { 2F ().) - 1} ( 1 - X) . 
The informed investor's optimal trading rule is to choose d = 1 whenever u > 
>.. Therefore, "the market 's" conjecture about ). is fulfilled if and only if ). 
E [P(D, V) ld = 1]. Finally, one can show that ). = E [P(D, V)ld = 1] is equivalent 
t o determining a ). t hat satisfies t he following relation 
). = E [ u I u ~ >.] 1 N v ( ( N - V ){ X + 1 - 2F ().)} 
N ( + ~,?; V{x+ 1- 2F (>.)}+ N{2F (>.) -1}(1- x) 
(N _ 1)!C;x )v-1 xN- v ) 
x (N - V)! (V - B)!(B- 1)! ) . 
Now consider again the expression above for price as a function of the {D, V} pair 
_ _ >(D)[ (N - V) {x+ 1-2F (>.)} l 
p ( D , v ) - E [ u I u - >.] N 1 + v {X + 1 - 2F ().)} + N { 2F ().) - 1} ( 1 - X) . 
Note that this expression is linear in t otal net demand, D , but not t rading volume, 
V . To be exclusively linear in D, it must be t hat x + 1 - 2F (>.) = 0; the latter 
Formally, any expression, such as P(D, V : x , A), tha t results from the market maker's beliefs 
about A should have a carot over the A (i.e. , .\) , as .\ represents the market maker's conjecture about 
the behavior of A. To simplify the n otion , however, I suppress the carot in my discussion. 
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forces t he second expression inside the square brackets to zero. But the expression 
x+1 - 2F (>.) = 0 is equivalent to 2(1-F (>.))-(1-x) = 0. This, in turn, requires that 
the probability that the informed investor participate (i.e., not defer trade), which is 
2(1-F (>.) ), be equal to the probability that an uninformed t rader participate, which 
is 1 - x . In other words, when the probability of trade is independent of type (i.e ., 
2(1 - F (>.)) - (1 - x) = 0) , trading volume plays no role! Otherwise, it does play 
a role and price depends upon both t otal net demand and trading volume in some 
nonlinear fashion. 
Unlike previous models, note that I have not included an explicit term for disclo-
sure (primarily to ease the notational burden) . As an alternative, consider a concept 
that is very similar t o disclosure: the amount of common knowledge, or a priori in-
formation, available about t he asset. In the context of the model under discussion, 
this is represented by h, the precision of u. In effect, increasing h is tantamount to 
more a priori information about the asset .42 Alternatively, >. represents the inverse 
of market depth: as,.\ declines, market depth increases. For the model proposed here, 
one can show that the derivative of ,.\ with respect to h, >.h, is negative: that is, ,.\ de-
creases as t he precision of the firm's uncertain value, h increases. Specifically, one can 
show: >.h = -~h-1 >.. In other words, more a priori information implies an increase 
in market depth. There are a variety of addit ional insights arising from the relation 
between h and ..\. For example, the likelihood of an informed investor participating 
in the market is 2 (1- F (>.)). Note, however, that this likelihood is invariant with 
42As su ch, it may be inappropriate to interpret has disclosure, per se, becau se changing h changes the 
underlying nature of the asset. For example, higher (lower) h also implies a less (more) risky asset. 
Perhaps a better characterization of disclosure would be one in w hich the amount of information 
available about the asset's realization increases without changing its return behavior: see Kim and 
Verrecchia [2001] . 
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respect to changes in h 
~2(1 -F (-\) ) 
dh 
d 
- 2(dh F (-\) + f (-\)-\h) 
- (h-1-\f(-\)- h-1-\f(-\)) 
0. 
In effect, for the normal distribution that I assume, any change in ,\ brought about 
by a change in h offset s any change in the distribution function itself, so as t o ensure 
that fhF (-\) = 0 . Nonetheless, the informed investor's expected trading profits fall 
as precision increases. To see this, first note that the informed investor's expected 
trading profits are given by 
1]]! (t)dt + /_: -[t- E [Pid = -1]]! (t)dt 
2 (1= tf (t) dt--\ [1- F (-\)]) 
2100 (1 - F (t )) dt, 
where this computation relies on the equilibrium relation E[P id = 1] = A. Further-
more, the derivative of this expression with respect to his negative: that is, 
d 100 
-2 (1- F (t)) dt 
dh >-
In short, an increase in common knowledge about the asset (i.e., an increase in h) 
does not change the informed investor's expected pa rticipation, but it does reduce his 
expected trading profits. The latter seems consistent with the sensible notion that 
more a priori information about u makes t he informed investor worse off by reducing 
his information advantage (if not his actual participation). 
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Let me summarize the implicat ions of this model as follows. To t he ex tent t o which 
one believes, or has reason t o believe, tha t t rading volume informat ion is an important 
conditioning variable, t his model lays out how ex pectations could b e condit ioned over 
information a bout both demand and volu m e. To t he ext ent to which one believes 
that tra ding volu m e information is only very incremental in the presence of demand 
information, t his model suggests t hat there is a mainta ined assumption t ha t achieves 
this. Sp ecifically, if one maintains tha t t he likelihood of trad e is independent of type, 
trading volum e is a ''wash" a nd pla ys no informational role. With regard t o these two 
beliefs, I p rofess that I am a n agnost ic. That having been said, in the more complex 
model I p resent here in which ex pectations a re condit ioned over trading volume, it 
should be acknowledged tha t t he relat ion between common know ledge (i.e ., h) and 
m arket depth (i.e. , >.) is una ffect ed. T hat is, as in models in which agent s condition 
ex clusively over net demand, more common knowledge result s in more market depth . 
Consequently, to the extent to which one want s to avoid the charge that one is 
responding t o a n ''imagined" problem, some m ot ivation for including t rading volume 
as a conditioning varia ble may be required . 
By way of summary let me say the following. As wit h a ll m a intained assumptions, 
whet her or n ot including volume as a condit ioning varia ble is useful depends u pon 
t he nature of t he p roblem one is stud ying. For example, if a study is premised on the 
notion t hat volu m e is a useful source of information for det ermining firm value in the 
p resence of an already rich disclosure environment, t hen obv iously its omission from 
a m odel of t rade is a serious oversight . In t he a bsence of t hat premise, the seriousness 
of the oversight is unclear. 
Summary. Before offering a summary of t he associat ion-based d isclosure, let 
me first briefly list some addit ional a ssumpt ions that were m a int ained in this ex er-
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c1se. For example, I have ignored the role of d iverse analyst and/ or management 
forecasts in advance of disclosure. 43 Forecasts may represent a n additional element 
of disclosure that alters all the relations discussed above. In addit ion, I have ig-
nored the role of asymmetric tax effects in conjunction with disclosure. Differences 
in short- and long-t erm capital gains t a x rates can result in a "lock-in" effect at the 
time of disclosure. The lock-in effect, in turn, may dampen price changes and trad -
ing volume at the time of d isclosure (if the marginal invest or is subject to tax) .44 
Also, I have endowed exogenously investor agents wit h private information. When 
private information acquisition is endogenous, however , relations among d isclosure, 
price changes, and trading volume can be a ltered. This is because anticipated public 
disclosure cha nges the incentives of investor agent s to become privately informed; 
t his, in turn, affects price changes and trading volume at the time of disclosure.45 
This problem is exacerbat ed when, in addition, t he cost of acquiring private infor-
mation is not homogeneous across investors. Fina lly, I have ignored the incentives to 
sell and/or distribute information.46 
By way of summary, let me submit that the association-based disclosure stud-
ies have been very successful. They offer detailed characterizations of t he relations, 
or associations, among disclosure, price changes, trading volume, and other market 
phenomena (e.g ., market depth) for a broad class of investor-agent diversity. For 
example , in t his essay I discussed invest or agents who were diversely informed, in-
43For a discussion of the effects of analysts' forecasts, see A bar banell, et al. [1995], Ba rron, et al. 
[1998], and Trueman [1996] (see also Verrecchia [1996b]). 
44For suggestions as to how tax effects may affect the associations among disclosure, price changes, 
and trading volume, see Shevlin and Shackelford [2000]. 
45See, for example, Verrecchia [1982a], Kim and Verrecchia [1991b], Demski and Feltham [1994], 
McNichols and Trueman [1994], F ischer and Verrecchia [1998], and Barth, et al. [1999]. For a 
recent paper in the economics literature that reviews briefly prior work on information acquisition 
in financial markets , see Barlevy and Veronesi [2000]. 
46See, for example, Bushman and Indjejikian [1995]; see a lso Ad mati and Phleiderer [1986, 1988b]. 
59 
terpret disclosu re in diverse ways, incorporate disclosure into t heir beliefs in diverse 
ways, etc. As for the models themselves , t hey are remarkably facile a nd robust, easy 
t o work with, a nd lead t o a variety of interesting characterizations . It must also 
be acknowledged, however, that a critical maintained assumption in these models is 
that disclosure is exogenous . To underst and t he role of endogenous d isclosure, let us 
p roceed t o the next essay. 
3 Discretionary-Based Disclosure 
W hat discretion does a manager or firm exercise with regard to the disclosure of in-
formation that m ay be useful for valuing the firm, and a bout which they may have 
knowledge? Economist s have long a rgued in a variety of venues that the adverse-
selection problem inherent in a seller simultaneously offering an asset for sale to a 
potential buyer and w ithholding information about the asset's quality, propels the 
seller to fully disclose t o the buyer.47 The rationa le underlying this result is that 
a rat ional buyer interprets withheld information as information t hat is unfavorable 
about the asset's value or quality. Consequently, the buyer discounts the asset's value 
until the point at which it is in t he seller ' s best int erests to reveal t he information, 
however unfavorable it may be. The notion t hat withheld information can be "un-
raveled" by the behavior of rational buyers is a seminal result that forms the basis 
for nearly all of t he subsequent research on this topic. 
Extending this idea into the realm of financial reporting is not difficult . While a 
considerable amount of financia l report ing is mandatory (e.g ., quarterly st atements, 
annual reports, proxy stat em ents, etc.), managers may still posses additional infor-
mation whose disclosure is not required - information that is nonet heless useful in 
47See Grossman and Hart [1980], Grossman [1981], and Milgrom [1981]. 
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valuing the firm 's future prospects. Consequently, under what circumstances will a 
manager disclose or withhold this information? 
In the acoounting literature, early work on this question suggested the following.48 
If a manager's objective is t o maximize the current market capitalization of the firm 
and there are costs associat ed with the information's disclosure, equilibria exist in 
which information t hat favorably enhances the firm's current market capitalization is 
disclosed, and information t hat unfavorably enhances ma rket capitalization is with-
held. In other words, there exist equilibria in which not all informat ion is disclosed. 
Note, in particular, that information is wit hheld despite the fact t hat market agents 
(e.g., investors) have "rational expectations" about its content: that is, t hey presume 
that withheld information is less favorable information. While there are a variet y of 
costs that can support the withholding of informat ion in equilibrium, a rguably the 
most compelling is the cost associated with disclosing information that is proprietary 
in nature. 
Features integra l t o this early work spawned a host of competing models of vol-
unta ry disclosure. For example, some suggested that this work offered exclusively a 
theory of information that is permanently wit hheld, and hence failed t o explain why 
managers exercise discretion (through the timing of disclosure or forecasts) over infor-
mation whose release was inevitable, like earnings announcements.49 Others explored 
the sensitiv ity of the results t o multiple signa ls.50 Still others examined the effect of 
disclosure on the expected contribution to a public good (e.g ., "free-riding'' ) a nd the 
48See Verrecchia [1983]; see also Jovanovic [1982] a nd Lanen and Verrecchia [1987]. 
49See, for example, Trueman [1986]. The analysis in Truem a n [1986] is more a signaling s tory 
than a discretionary disclosure analysis in tha t t he manager unambig uously discloses informa tion 
(as opposed to exercising discretion) a s soon as he receives new information, so as to "signal" his 
comp et ence; see also Hughes [1986]. Note that Verrecchia [1983] does offer a rationale for exercisin g 
discretion (through the timing of disclosure) over information whose release is inev itable by appealing 
to the idea that propriet a ry costs dissipate through time. 
50See Kirschenhei ter [1 997] . 
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likelihood that cooperat ive efforts colla pse.51 Fina lly, som e pointed out t he failure 
t o consider t he int eraction bet ween either: voluntary disclosure a nd mandated dis-
closure, where t he requirement for m ore of the lat t er may increase the incent ives for 
more of the former; or cost ly disclosure a nd costless d isclosure , where the existence 
of the former may in hi bit t he lat ter because of possible int erd epend encies between 
t he two.52 
Wit h rega rd to early work in t he accounting literatu re, t hree issues seem ed to be 
of pa rt icular concern: 1) t he reliance on an exogenous proprieta ry cost t o explain 
the wit hholding of information; 2) the reliance on t rut hful report ing; and 3) the 
reliance on the manager 's objective as one of boosting t he firm's current capita lizat ion 
level, even in the event t hat this practice jeopardizes firm value in t he fut ure . W it h 
regard t o the relia nce on costs, in the disclosu re lit erature "uncertaint y" offers a n 
alternat ive ra tionale for the wit hholding of informat ion in t he absence of a n exogenous 
proprieta ry cost . For example, t here is t he possibility that information is withheld 
beca use uncertainty exists a bout whether the manager is informed or , equivalently, 
whet her the informat ion in question has yet to a rrive. 53 To digress briefly, uncertain 
information existence or arriva l works like a d isclosure cost in that it creates doubt 
in the minds of t he uninformed, t hereby ameliorating t he adverse-selection problem . 
Hence it supports t he wit hholding of information. In add ition to withholding arising 
from uncert a inty a bout the existence of informat ion, t here is a lso the possibility 
that information is wit hheld beca use of uncertainty about ''types" : for ex ample, the 
51See Teoh [1997]. 
52See Dye [1986]: on t he topic of voluntary versus m a nda ted d isclosure, see a lso Dye [1985b,1990] . 
See also Gig ler and Hem mer [1999], who suggest that on e role of mandatory d isclosure may b e a s a 
vehicle useful in creating an environment in w hich managers can credibly communicate their more 
value-relevant volunta ry d isclosures. T hey refer t o t his as the "confirma tory role" of ma nda t ory 
d isclosure. 
53See , for example, Dye [1985a], J ung a nd Kwon [1988], a nd Dye and S rid har [1995]. 
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"type" of manager or the "type" of firm. In t he case of the former, information 
may be (rationally) withheld because it can be used to value the human capital of 
the manager, a s well as the firm.54 In the case of the latter, information may be 
withheld because the immediate benefit (cost) of a favorable (unfavorable) report has 
t o be weighed against the credibility gain or loss at a subsequent date when more 
information is forthcoming. 55 
With regard to the relia nce on the exogenous restriction to truthful reporting, 
some have questioned the assumption that if the manager chooses to release her pri-
vate information, then she does so truthfully. Truthful reporting is t ypically justified 
by appealing to the potential litigation and human capital erosion costs associated 
with dissembling. While this restriction seems descriptive of many settings in ac-
counting where audited financial statements may corroborate the manager's disclo-
sure, there are instances, such as t he provision of forw-a rd-looking information, where 
it is more difficult to assess the integrity of the manager's disclosure.56 Persuasion 
and cheap-talk games relax the restriction that the manager is obliged t o disclose 
truthfully, if she discloses at a ll. In these games, the credibility of the manager's 
disclosure becomes a key issue. For example, persuasion games have the feature that 
while the manager need not fully reveal his private information, he may not misrepre-
sent it: for example, the manager may vaguely claim that the firm is expected to have 
earnings of at least $1 per share when in fact he expects earnings to be exactly $1 per 
54See Nagar [1999]; see also Kim [1999]. 
55See Teoh and Hwang [1991]. 
56While on the topic of credible disclosure, by prior agreement it was decided that contracting 
issues in general, and the Revelation Principle in particular, would fall under the auspices of a 
companion survey paper, Lambert [2000] . Specifically, Lambert [2000] discusses privat e information 
and communication (in section 4) and earnings management and the Revelation Principle (in section 
5). While these topics have some bearing on issues discussed in this essay, we decided to allocate 
them in this ma nner so as to avoid overlap in t he respective surveys. 
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share.57 Other work in t his area examines the effect of rules governing disclosure.58 
Cheap-t alk games a re those where t he players ' payoffs are determined by t he action 
that the manager's disclosure induces and not directly by his costless d isclosure. In 
these games, the manager's disclosure may be false: for example, a manager may 
claim t hat the firm is expected to have earnings of $2 per share when in fact he 
expects earnings t o be ex actly $1 per share . Because the manager is free to offer any 
self-serv ing report irrespective of his privately observed , non-verifiable information, 
this modeling choice is part icularly useful for examining the amount of information 
a manager can communicate when t he credibility of his disclosure is a key feature of 
the environment.59 Finally, as an alternative to cheap-talk games where disclosure 
distortions are cost less, the not ion of costly distortions has a lso been considered.60 
57For exa mple, interpreting t his work in a "market" context, one could suggest that M ilgrom and 
Roberts (1986] consider a game w here a ma nager attempts to increase the stock price by convincing 
investors tha t the firm has favorable earnings prospects. Investors assume t he worst in the sense tha t 
they believe that the firm 's earnings prospect s equal t he lowest level consis t ent with the cla im b eing 
truth ful. These beliefs support a n equilibrium characterized by full revelation. Shin [1994] extend s 
this model and analyzes the pricing of a firm's stock when a manager is exogenously endowed wit h 
information and investors are uncertain about its qua lity. He show s that the responsiveness of the 
stock price t o the firm's disclosure reveals invest ors' beliefs ab out the credibility of that d isclosure . 
580nce again interpreting this work in a "market " context, one could suggest that Matthews and 
Postlewaite (1985] assume that t he manager is not exogenously informed about t he firm's earnings 
prospects , but must decide whether to voluntarily gather informa t ion tha t will perfectly reveal the 
fi rm's earnings. They examine t he effect on t he m a nager 's incentives to gather inform at ion if he 
is required to report it. On the other hand, F ishman and Ha gerty (1990] consider t he effect of 
restricting t he vagueness with which a m anager may reveal his information. They note tha t limits 
on the manager's discretion may increase the amount of information communicated. 
59Crawford a nd Sobel [1982] esta blished that disclosure may be partia lly informative, prov ided the 
manager 's and investor's incentives a re not too misaligned. Subsequent work has further examined 
the credibility problem tha t is central t o cheap-talk ga mes. For instance, Farrell and Gibbons 
[1989], N ewman and Sansing [1993], and G igler (1994] focus on the impact of different users (e.g. , 
investors and competitors) on a manager ' s incent ives t o disclose his information. They show that 
the presence of two audiences who resp ond to the information differently may enha nce the credibility 
of the ma nager's d isclosure. Nevertheless, with in these single period settings, full revelation of the 
m anager's information does not occur. In contrast , within a multi-period set t ing, Stocken (2000] 
shows that reputational cons iderations may be sufficient t o support full r evelat ion of a ma nager 's 
information. 
60See Fischer and Verrecchia [2000]. 
64 
But in reading over the accounting literature, it would appear that the thorniest 
problem with the early work was its reliance on the assumption that the manager's 
objective in exercising discretion in disclosure was to boost the firm's current capi-
talization level, even in t he event that this practice jeopardized future ret urns. For 
example, if there are costs associated w ith disclosing informat ion whose dissemina-
tion is not required, and the sole effect of disclosure is to provide an immediate and 
ephemeral boost t o the firm's current market price, perhaps firm shareholders should 
contract with the manager to never disclose voluntarily. In other words, to w hat ex-
t ent does maximizing current capitalization eschew totally efficiency and/ or agency 
problems implicit in voluntary disclosure?61 
Throughout accounting, one often-stated rationale for a manager to be concerned 
with the firm's current capitalization level, as opposed to the firm's future value, is 
that contracts are incomplete. For example, there may be no way for the manager to 
be rewarded on the basis of the future value of t he firm, if for no other reason than 
the fact that he may not be around when the future a rrives. In addition, there may 
be compelling reasons why current market valuations are important, such as the pos-
sibility that the firm intends to issue additional equity to finance fut ure operations, 
or as currency in stock-swa ps. Yet another interesting rationale to consider is that 
maximizing current market capit alization may simply be a heurist ic behavior on the 
manager's part. For example, perhaps the manager maximizes current market capi-
61As pointed out by Dontoh [1989], another problem w ith maximizing current capitalization, as 
opposed to future returns, is that it offers no possibility for the voluntary disclosure of bad news, 
w hich seems inconsistent with the extant empirical literat ure. Of course, one way a round this 
problem is to assume that m a nagers voluntarily disclose so as to minimize current firm price, perhaps 
in part to ensure positive price reactions to subsequent ma ndated announcements (as well as to 
minimize the liability associated with withholding information that negatively impacts current firm 
valua tions). See Teoh and Hwang [1991] for a model in which a separating equilibrium exists in 
w hich "good news" is withheld and "bad news" disclosed. 
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talization because he has been conditioned t o believe that he is truly being evaluated 
based on this benchmark, regardless of his contract . Anecdotal evidence in support 
of this idea is the fact that business media a rt icles about top managers commonly 
allude t o t he level of market capitalization increase or decrease during t hat manager's 
tenure with the firm. 
But in view of t his problem, an alternative model for mot ivating voluntary disclo-
sure is to follow the general outline of the origina l story, which is based on the notion 
of proprietary costs, and then show how t hese proprietary costs arise endogenously 
in a duopoly game played between two firms that seek to maximize future returns 
(as opposed t o current market value) .62 By couching the disclosure problem in the 
context of a duopoly game played between two firms, the decision t o disclose by one 
firm assists the other firm's production decisions, and/or whether to enter a particular 
market for the manufacture of some good in the first place. Because duopoly ga mes 
t ypically lead t o qua dratic optimiza t ion problems, t hey are very facile . Consequently, 
it is little wonder that there are a cornucopia of papers in the accounting literat ure 
that exploit this t echnology t o study discretionary disclosure. 63 
Duopoly game papers have two important features. First, m their voluntary 
disclosure decisions, managers can be made to be concerned with future firm value, 
which resolves t he problem of assuming t hat managers seek t o maximize current 
value.64 Second, a duopoly setting characterizes well how the release of information 
62This is essent ially the centra l feature of papers like Da rrough and Stoughton [1988], Feltham and 
Xie [1992], and Wagenhofer [1990], among others. 
63To cite a few more papers, see Feltham, et al. [1992], Darrough [1993], a nd Gigler, et al. [1994). 
64Qf course, maximizing future value is not a requirement of a duopoly game. In the context of 
a duopoly game ma nagers can still be concerned exclusively w ith current value: see, fo r example, 
Hayes and Lundholm [1996), as well as model #2 in the subsequent subsect ion. In addition, it is 
also possible t hat managers' motiva tion t o disclose is governed by neither current nor future firm 
values. For example, Bushm an and Indjejikian [1995) assume that a manager discloses volunt arily 
to boost insider trading profits by reducing the trading aggressiveness of other privately informed 
agents . 
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creates proprietary cost s endogenously. While all of this is to t he good, there are 
criticisms of t his a pproach. First , it could be argued t hat once the nature of t he cost 
has been identified (i.e ., t he fact that it is proprieta ry), there is little additional ins ight 
associat ed with showing how it evolves endogenously. Second, duopoly gam es, per 
se, may not thwart the "unraveling" of wit hheld information in the a bsence of some 
additional modeling feature. The reason for t his is that if two firms compete in the 
same (or similar) product market(s), the act of wit hholding inform ation by one firm 
may be interpreted by his competitor as information that favors boosting output . 
Once boosted beyond a certain level by a compet itor, however , output negatively 
impacts on t he informed firm's ability to generate revenues in his product m arket, 
thereby propelling t he latt er to fully disclose to t he former. 
Putting aside t he narrow issue of which collection of stylized assumptions best 
characterizes the discretionary nature of disclosure, a broader crit icism of discre-
t ionary disclosure models in the accounting literat ure in toto should focus on two 
problems: the result s offered a re highly sensitive to specific modeling assumptions, 
and the discretionary disclosure arrangements , per se, are typically inefficient . W ith 
regard t o the first issue, the literature documents that results in d uopoly games de-
pend upon whether: t he competit ion is Cournot (quant ity setting) or Bertra nd (price 
setting), the private information is cost or demand information, and whether the de-
cision to disclose is m ade ex post or ex ante. 65 Another area in which results depend 
upon model nua nces is in t he relation between volunt ary disclosure a nd com pet i-
t ion. For example, some have m odeled competition in the cont ext of an ent ry game 
(i.e., a game in which one firm contemplates prod ucing a good already produced by 
some other firm) and cla imed that greater competition encourages m ore d isclosure . 
65See specifically Darrough [1993], who does a n excellent job of delineating t he sensitiv ity of these 
assumptions on results. 
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Alternatively, others have modeled competition in the context of a post-entry game 
(i.e., a game in which both firms are currently producing) and cla imed that greater 
competition inhibits more disclosure.66 Yet another area of controversy brought on 
by seemingly innocuous differences in modeling assumptions is the relation between 
voluntary disclosure and t he ex ante differential information quality between the man-
ager and t he market. Here, some have cla imed that higher differential information 
quality leads to more voluntary disclosure while others have cla imed the reverse.67 
With regard to the efficiency of discretionary d isclosure arrangements, it is use-
ful to introduce the following semantic d istinctions. By a discretionary disclosure 
arrangement, I mea n a sit uation in which m a nagers or firms exercise discretion with 
respect to the disclosure of information a bout which they may have knowledge (i.e ., ex 
post ) . Alternatively, by a precommitment arrangement or mechanism, I mean a situ-
at ion in which managers or firms establish a preferred disclosure policy in the absence 
of any prior k nowledge of the informat ion (i.e. , ex ante ). My point about efficiency 
is that often arrangements in which managers are granted t he discretion to disclose 
ex post are inefficient in comparison to arrangements in which the firm (or managers) 
precommit ex ante. For example, t ypically one can show t hat precommitting to a 
policy of either no disclosure or full disclosure before t he informat ion arrives, or per-
haps electing t o never become informed in the first place, dominat es a lternatives in 
which the manager exercises discretion a fter receiving the information. For example, 
some have shown that precommitments to nondisclosure in the Cournotj dem and and 
Bertrand/ cost cases, a nd precommitments t o full disclosure in t he Cournot/cost and 
Bertrand/ demand cases , dominate alternative disclosure arrangements.68 Similarly, 
66For the former see Darrough and Stoughton [1990] (see also Verrecchia [1990b]), and for t he latter 
see Clinch and Verrecchia [1997]. 
67See Verrecchia [1990a] for the former and Penno [1997] and Dye [1998] for the reverse. 
68See Darrough [1 993]. 
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ot hers have show n that it is optimal for the manager t o precommit never to become 
informed (or otherwise proscribe this behavior) , lest the m a nager be t empted t o en-
gage in costly disclosure activit ies ex post. 69 Consequently, if, in the face of all t his , 
a manager cont inues t o exercise discret ion in the d isclosure of information ex post, 
there must be som e u nstat ed, unmod eled , and/or unresolved agency problem or effi-
ciency consideration that lurks in the background. Of course, one commonly stat ed 
rationale for why managers are allowed the discretion to disclose ex post is that pre-
commitment mecha nisms do not exist. And while t his rat ionale is ind eed t rue, it has 
lit tle t o recommend it on economic grounds other than expediency. 
As in the p revious essay, below I present a series of increasingly m ore sophisticated, 
discretionary disclosu re modeling vignettes in an at t empt to illustrate t he evolution 
of the literature. Specially, in model #1 I discuss how the existence of either a fixed 
proprietary cost or uncertainty about the existence of withheld information leads to 
equilibr ia in which information is some t imes disclosed and some t imes wit hheld, 
assuming that a firm seeks t o maximize it s current value . In m od el # 2 I relax the 
assumpt ion of fixed costs t o allow for endogenous, variable proprietary costs , but 
cont inue to assume that a firm seeks t o maximize its current value. The provocative 
feature of m odel # 2 is that while it suggests t hat the optimal d isclosure policy ex 
post is one of full disclosure, it also suggests t hat the optimal disclosure policy ex 
ante is one of no disclosure; this points out the potent ial inefficiency of discretionary 
disclosure arrangements. In model # 3, I extend the a nalysis to a duopoly sit uation 
in which t he firm adopts a disclosure policy t o maximize expected profits: t hat is , 
69See Verrecchia [1990a] . See also Pae [1999], who demonstrates in a clever model of discretionary 
disclosure that in the absence of prohibitions on becoming informed, two types of potential efficiency 
losses m ay a rise. F irst , there is t he ( potential) efficiency loss that results from a manager acquiring 
costly information so as to be able to disclose favorable news at his discretion. Second, there is the 
(potential) efficiency loss t ha t results from the ma nager overinvesting in effort (rela tive to the first 
best level) because doing so reduces information acquisit ion costs. 
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the firm maximizes future value and not current value. Here, as well, I point out 
that there ma y exist ex ante precommitment arrangements that dominate allowing 
the firm the d iscretion t o disclose ex post. Finally, in model #4 I extend the duopoly 
setting further to one in which there is no requirement that firms disclose truthfully. 
Constant Proprietary Costs (Model #1).7° Consider a firm that produces a 
good this period based on demand for the product next period. Next period's demand 
is characterized by a price P, where P is represented by 
P = a + !3Y- x , 
and a, and /3 are fixed, positive constants (i.e., a > 0, and /3 > 0) , Y IS some 
proprietary information about next period's price that is known only to the firm, and 
x is the quantity produced by the firm this period. In other words, the firm produces 
x this period t o achieve revenue of xP next period. Because realizations of Y are 
proprietary, they are only known to the market if t hey are disclosed by the firm. In 
the absence of disclosure, the market treat s Y as an unknown random variable that 
is distributed uniformly between - k and k. For reasons that will become clearer 
in subsequent extensions of this model, at this stage of t he discussion I want to 
limit the interpretation of model #1 to one in which t here is (exclusively) a positive 
association between realizations of Y = Y along the continuum between - k and k 
and the firm's revenue next period, x P. The benefit of a positive association is that 
one can interpret increasingly higher realizations of Y = Y as increasingly "better 
news" because they indicate higher revenue next period. As I show below, a sufficient 
condition to achieve a positive association is to assume that a ~ /3k. Consequently, I 
assume a ~ /3k in both models #1 and #2, and then relax t his assumpt ion in model 
70Jn conjunction with model # 1, see Jovanovic [1982] and Verrecchia [1983]. 
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# 3.71 
Also in models # 1 and # 2, I assume that the firm' s discretionary disclosure policy 
is t o maximize the firm's current value (for whatever reason). Because increasingly 
higher realizations of Y = Y imply increasingly "better news," the firm is naturally 
predisposed toward disclosing high realizations of Y = Y as an ind ication of high 
revenue next period. The dilemma for the firm is t hat knowledge of Y = Y is 
proprietary, perhaps b ecause it can be used by ot her, competing firms t o set t heir 
production schedules for t he go od, or goods that are close substitutes . Here, I assume 
that the proprietary cost associated with d isclosing any realization of Y = Y is 
c, where c > 0. Not e that this implies t hat the proprietary cost associated wit h 
disclosing any information is fixed and invariant, independent of the information . 
To d etermine w het her the firm discloses its proprietary information, consider its 
investment decision when Y = Y is disclosed. In this situation the fi rm produces the 
amount x so as t o maximize 
max xE[PjY = Y ] = x(a: + (3Y - x) . 
Not e that this function is concave in x and otherwise well behaved. This implies 
producing a quantity 
1 
x = 2(a: + (3Y ), 
and selling this quantity for 
1 
p = Q; + (3Y- X = 2(a: + (3Y ) 
m the next period. Note t hat one consequence of assum ing a: ~ (3k is that the 
quantity of the good produced this period and the price at which t he good sells next 
71As I show below, another fea t ure of assuming a 2 (Jk is that it ensures t hat in this m odel the 
quantity of the good produced this period and the price a t which the good sells next period a re bot h 
nonnegative in equilibrium. 
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period, i.e., x = P =~(a+ ,BY ), are bot h nonnegative for allY E [- k, k]. In addition, 
regardless of whether the firm discloses or wit hholds Y = Y, its revenue nex t period 
(exclusive of any proprietary costs) is x P = ~(a+ ,BY)2 . Finally, note that because 
d~xP = ~,8 (a + ,BY) ;::: 0 for all Y E [- k, k] when a ;::: ,Bk, realizations of Y and 
revenue are posit ively associated. 
The market values t he firm based on its knowledge of the firm' s revenue next 
period (if Y = Y is disclosed) or its ex pectat ion of revenue (if Y = Y is wit hheld) . 
W hen Y = Y is disclosed, t he market knows that the firm's revenue next period is 
(including the proprietary cost) 
- - 1 2 
E [xPIY = Y] = "4 (a+ ,BY ) - c. 
Alternatively, consider what occurs when Y = Y is not disclosed. Because realiza-
tions of Y = Y and revenue are positively associated, the market conjectures that 
- A 
realizations of Y that are withheld must be below some threshold Y that does not 
warrant incurring t he proprietary cost c. Consequently, when Y = Y is not disclosed, 
the market assesses the firm's revenue next period as 
E[~(a + ,BY )2 jY = Y <::: Y] 
1
1
2 (3a
2 + 3a,B(Y - k ) + ,82 (Y2 - Yk + k 2) ). 
This implies t hat based on a realization of Y = Y , the difference bet ween disclosing 
and wit hholding this information from the market on t he firm's current va lue is 
E [xPjY = Y] - c - E [xPjY <::: Y] 
± (a + ,8Y) 2 - c - 1
1
2 (3a
2 + 3a,B(Y - k ) + ,82 (Y2 - Yk + k 2) ). 
Consequently, the firm is motivated to d isclose Y = Y when t his expression is positive 
and wit hhold it when t he expression is negative, because t his arrangement maximizes 
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the market's expectation of the firm's revenue next period, and hence the firm's cur-
rent value. That value of Y that leaves the firm indifferent between d isclosing and 
withholding is the t hreshold level of disclosure. Specifically, the threshold level Y is 
defined such t hat E[xPJY = Y ] - c- E[xPJY ::::; Y ] is nonnegative for all Y ;:::: Y and 
negative for allY< Y. One can show that here a unique threshold level of disclosure 
occurs at 
In particular, this threshold has the feature that Y > - k, provided c > 0. 
The economic interpretation of Y = - 4~ (3a + f3k - J9(a - f3k )2 + 96c) is that 
it is the level of "news" t hat leaves t he firm indifferent between disclosing Y = Y at 
- - A 
a cost c and withholding the realization Y = Y. Because values of Y = Y above Y 
indicate high demand for the good, the firm is w illing to provide this information to 
the market for valuation purposes despite the proprietary costs associated with this 
- A 
decision. Alternatively, because values of Y = Y below Y indicate average or low 
demand for the good, the firm is justified in w ithholding knowledge of Y = Y because 
this information does not enhance valuation and its d isclosure entails a proprietary 
cost. Note that at c = 0, Y = -k. In other words, in the absence of proprietary 
costs, the on ly equilibrium threshold is one that implies full disclosure. In addition, 
as c increases, Y increases. In other words, disclosure thresholds rise as proprietary 
costs rise. 
To d igress briefly, a variation on this model is to assume that there are no pro-
prietary costs, but, instead, the firm is only known to be informed with probability q 
and uninformed with probability 1- q.72 Note that when the firm is uninformed, it 
produces x = ~a, and at that quantity the goods sell for a price P = ~a + f3Y . T his 
72See, for example, Dye [1985a] and Jung and Kwon [1988]. 
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implies that E [xPJ = fcl. Consequently, here the t hreshold level of disclosure, Y, is 
determined by finding the Y that solves 
E[xPif = YJ - qE[xPp7 ~ YJ - (1 - q) E[xPJ = 0, 
which is equivalent to finding the Y that solves 
Note, for example, t hat ifthe firm is known to be informed with certainty (i.e. , q = 1) , 
then the threshold level of disclosure is -k, which implies full disclosure. In other 
words, a firm known to be informed with certainty is tantamount to a firm with no 
proprietary costs. 
Returning to my original model, while much of the discretionary disclosure lit-
erature has focused primarily on threshold levels of disclosure, arguably it is not 
threshold levels per se that are of interest, but rather the unconditional probability, 
or likelihood, of disclosure. One reason for this is that from an empirical perspec-
tive, threshold levels of disclosure are likely unobservable, whereas the probability of 
disclosure is potentially knowable through observations on repeated plays of a discre-
tionary disclosure game. Recall that if Y is a random variable distributed uniformly 
between k and -k, then the probability of disclosure is 
1 r 
max[ 2k }y dY, OJ max[2~ (k - ¥),OJ 
max[8~k (sf3k + 3a- J 9(a - f3k)2 + 96c) ,OJ. 
Note that t he probability of disclosure is less t han 1 provided that c > 0, and greater 
than 0 provided that c is not too large. 
Now consider the relation between disclosure and information quality. In our 
analysis, note that the manager is assumed to know the determinant of price perfectly 
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(i.e., he knows Y), while a priori the market only knows Y to be uniformly distributed 
between k and -k. The variance of a uniformly distributed random variable is !k2 . In 
effect, the variance increases as the support of t he uniform, k, widens . Consequently, 
k can be thought of as a measure of informat ion asymmetry, or ex ante differential 
information quality, between the market and the manager. T he higher k, the less the 
market knows relative to the manager a priori. In this context an interesting question 
here is how the threshold level of d isclosure shifts a s information asymmetry between 
the market and the manager grows. In the model currently under discussion , one 
can show t hat t he probability of disclosure generally increases as k increases.73 This 
implies that as information asymmetry between the market and the manager grows, 
in equilibrium the m anager discloses more often. One could a rgue that this result 
is eminently sensible: greater d isparity between what the manager knows and what 
the market knows exacerbates the adverse-selection problem. Thus, amelioration of 
this adverse-selection problem requires more disclosure. The problem is that some 
have a rgued t hat models with the opposite prediction are equally sensible. 74 All this 
points to a fragile relation between assumptions and predictions. 
The rationale for t he next model is that proprietary costs may not be constant : 
specifically, they may depend upon realizations of Y. For example, higher realizations 
of Y may imply greater costs and lower realizations may imply lower costs - or perhaps 
the reverse! But in any event , there may be some relation between information and 
the costs of d isclosing that information. To see t he effect of p roprietary costs t hat 
vary as a function of the manager's private knowledge, consider the next model. 
73If a 2:: 2(3k, then t he probability of disclosure is always increasing as k increases. If a < 2(3k, then, 
in addition, one needs c > a.l..(2(3k - a ): in other words, proprietary costs cannot be insignificant. 
74See specifically Penno [199¥J a nd Dye [1998]. Of course, as t he previous footnote suggests, one 
can also get this prediction by assuming that proprietary costs are insignificant. 
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Endogenous and Variable Proprietary Costs (Model #2).75 In this vari-
ation on the prior model, all previous assumptions are maintained except for the one 
concerning a constant proprietary cost. Specifically, here two firms are introduced 
who compete in a Cournot (quant ity setting) duopoly in which one firm is informed 
and t he other uninformed. In effect, each firm invests in the current perio d to produce 
some go od, in anticipation of t he fact that the good will sell for a price P in a future 
period, where Pis represent ed by 
P =a + {3Y - x1 - Xu, 
where a and /3 are all fixed, positive constants (i.e., a > 0, and /3 > 0), Y is some pro-
prietary information about the anticipated price that is known only to the informed 
firm, and X I and xu are the amounts produced by the informed and uninformed firms, 
respectively. Each firm's decision to produce is made without knowledge of the other 
firm' s decision. Because Y is unknown to either the uninformed firm or the market 
that values the future prospects of both firms, I continue to represent it by a random 
- -
variable Y, where Y has a uniform distribution between - k and k. Also as b efore, 
note that a high value of Y = Y along the continuum between -k and k continues 
to be "good news" because it indicates that the price at which the good will sell will 
be high in a future period. 
The dilemma faced by the informed firm is that if it discloses "good news," the 
uninformed firm will also come to know t his fact and boost its production accordingly, 
thereby negatively impacting on the informed firm's revenue. Consequently, in this 
model disclosure of a "good news" value of Y = Y entails a proprietary cost that 
varies with the disclosed information. 
75Jn conjunction with model #2, see Hayes and Lundholm [1996]. 
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To determine whether and when the informed firm discloses Y = Y, consider its 
investment decision when Y = Y is disclosed. When Y = Y is disclosed, let x f and xf] 
represent the quantities of the good produced by the informed and uninformed firms, 
respectively. Here, the informed firm produces the quantity xf so as t o maximize 
D -- D D D 
max x i E[PIY = Y] = xi (a+ (JY- x i - xu) . 
This implies that the informed firm produces an amount 
D 1 ( (} ' D) X I = 2 a + y - Xu ' 
where xB is the informed firm' s conjecture about t he uninformed firm 's production 
decision. Similarly, when Y = Y is disclosed, t he uninformed firm produces a quantity 
where xf is the un informed firm ' s conj ecture about t he informed firm 's production 
decision. Here, self-fulfilling conjectures on the part of both t he informed firm (about 
xf3) and the uninformed firm (about xf) that are self-fulfilling are xf = xB = 
t (a + (JY ), which implies that in equilibrium both firms produce the same amount. 
In addit ion, here the price at which both firms sell their goods is 
D D D 1 P =a+ (JY- XI - Xu = 3(a + (JY), 
which implies that the informed firm achieves revenues next period of xf pD = ~ (a+ 
Now consider the case in which the informed firm does not disclose Y = Y. When 
Y = Y is not disclosed, let x f and x£J represent the quantit ies of t he good produced 
by the informed and uninformed firms, respectively. Here the informed firm continues 
t o produce a quant ity 
xf =%(a+ (JY - x£f ), 
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where, once again, i:fJ is the informed firm's conjectu re about the uninformed firm's 
production decis ion. Here, the uninformed firm does not observe Y = Y. Despite 
this fact, being rat ional it conjectures that if Y were above some t h reshold, the 
informed firm would disclose Y = Y . As in model #1, the basis for this conjecture 
is the presumpt ion that the informed firm seeks to boost its current market value 
(for whatever reason), and disclosing high values of Y = Y achieves this. Define V 
by V = E[YIY = Y ::::; Y] = ! (Y - k ). In the absence of disclosing Y = Y , the 
uninformed firm solves 
max x {JE [Pif = Y::::; f] N ~N N - ~ xu E [a + {3Y - xI - Xu 1Y = Y ::::; Y] 
x{f(a + {3V- i:lj- x{f) , 
where, once again, i:lj is the u n informed firm's conjecture about the informed firm's 
- ~ 
production decision conditional on Y being below some threshold Y. This, in turn, 
implies that t he uninformed firm produces an amount 
N 1 ( {3 ~N) Xu = 2 a + V- XI . 
Here, conjectures that are self-fulfilling a re i:lj = ~ (2a + 3{3Y - {3V) and i:fj 
t (a + {3V ), which implies t hat the price at which both firms sell their goods is 
1 
pN =a + {3Y - xlj - x{f = 6" (2a + 3{3Y- {3V ). 
Consequently, here the informed firm's revenue next period is xlj p N = 3~ (2a + 3{3Y -
Now define current market value as the market's valuation of the informed firm 
based on the market's expectation of the revenue likely t o be achieved next per iod. 
W hen Y = Y is disclosed, t he market's expectation of t he revenue of the informed 
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firm next period is 
Alternatively, when Y = Y is not disclosed, the market's expectation of the revenue 
of the informed firm next period is 
E[3~ (2a + 3(3Y- (3V) 21Y = Y <::: Y] 
3
1
6 ( 4a
2 + 4a(3(Y - k ) + ~(32(Y2 - *Yk + k 2 )) , 
recalling that V = t (Y- k) . 
To understand at an intuitive level the nature of an equilibrium t o this problem, 
note that the difference between the revenue of the informed firm when disclosing 
- A 
Y = Y versus not disclosing and establishing a threshold at Y is 
E [xf pvw = Y] - E [xf PNW-:::: Y] 
1 2 1( 2 72 2 2 2) 
- (a+ (3Y) -- 4a + 4a(3(Y- k) + - (3 (Y - -Yk + k ) . 
9 36 4 7 
Consequently, as in the previous model, the informed firm is motivated t o disclose Y = 
Y when this expression is positive and withhold it when the expression is negative. 
One can show that the expression xf E[FD IY = Y ] - xf E[PNjY <::: Y ] reduces to 
1!4 /3 (Y + k) (16a + 9(3Y- 7{3k) and, consequently, there exists a threshold level of 
disclosure at Y = 9~ (7 {3k - 16a). That is, t here exists a unique threshold level of 
disclosure, namely, Y = 91 (7(3k - 16a), which has t he feature that the informed firm 
discloses whenever Y ;:::: Y = 9~ (7 {3k - 16a) and withholds otherwise. In addit ion, 
this threshold implies that the probability of disclosure is 
1 ~k 1 A 1 
- dx = - (k - Y) = - (8a + {3k) . 
2k y 2k 9{3k 
This all sounds good, but consider t he following. When a ;:::: {3k, the threshold 
level of disclosure is at the lowest realization of Y and t he probability of disclosure 
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1s always 1. That is, a ~ (3k implies that Y = 9~ (7 (3k - 16a) ::; -k and the 
probability of disclosure is 9~ (8a + (3k) ~ 1. In other words, in an attempt to 
ensure a positive association between realizations of Y and revenue next period, our 
assumptions have led us unwittingly to a model of full disclosure!76 Why is it the case 
that att empts on the part of t he informed firm to withhold proprietary information 
"unravel" here, but not in the previous model (i.e., model # 1)? Because realizations 
of Y and expected revenue next period are positively related, both the market and the 
uninformed firm int erpret w ithheld information as unambiguously "bad news," just 
as they would have in model # 1. Unlike model #1, however, here there is no fixed, 
or constant, proprietary cost to act as a discontinuity in the valuation of the informed 
firm depending upon whether t he information is disclosed or withheld. (In addit ion, 
there is no uncertainty as to the existence of the withheld information.) Consequently, 
here, information is always disclosed to the market, despite its proprietary nature. 
But the provocative feature of model #2 is that while it suggests that the in-
evitable disclosure policy ex post is one of full disclosure, it also suggests that the 
preferred disclosure policy ex ante is one of no disclosure. For example, from the dis-
cussion above we know that on the basis of establishing a threshold level of disclosure 
Y, the informed firm's expected revenue before Y is known or observed (i.e., ex ante) 
l S 
Y] iY > Y] + E[E[xf _?N!Y ::; YJIY ::; Y] 
~ f k ~ (a + (3Y)2 dY 
2k }y- 9 
76To see tha t there is indeed a positive association, note that w hen a: 2: {3k and the t hreshold 
level of disclosure implies full disclosure (i.e., Y = -k), then d~ xP P 0 = ~{3 (a:+ {3Y) 2: 0 and 
d~ x~ pN = f;f3 (za: + 3{3Y - ~{3 (fr - k)) = f;f3 (2a: + 3{3Y + {3k) 2:0 for allY E [- k , k]. Thus, as 
in model #1, high realizations of Y = Y can be interpreted unambiguously a s "good new s" because 
they indicate high revenue next period. 
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Next, note that the derivative of this function with respect to Y is 
This result implies t hat expected revenue is unambiguously increasing as the informed 
firm increases its threshold level of disclosure, Y. In effect, expected revenue and 
shareholders' welfare are maximized when the firm precommits to a policy of no 
disclosure (or, alternatively, prohibits the ma nager from becoming informed in the 
first place) . 77 In short, the (inevitable) ex post policy of full disclosure is in obvious 
conflict with the preferred ex ante policy of no disclosure. 
The fact t hat this model suggests an ex post policy of full disclosure, despit e 
the apparent inefficiency of this arrangement ex ante, leaves open the question as 
to whether there exists either some unstated or unmodeled benefit to exercising dis-
closure with some discretion. But a full discussion of this is left for the next essay. 
Before we get there, in our next volunt ary disclosure model we need to address a nother 
concern. Both models # 1 and #2 were premised on the assumption that ma nagers 
and/ or firms were concerned exclusively with the market's current valuation of the 
firm. As discussed previously, t his assumption is controversial. How ca n we expand 
these models to restrict the concerns of firms and/ or managers to the expected (or 
future or liquidating) value of the firm ? 
Maximizing Expected Firm Value (Model #3).78 To incorporate opti-
77This result should be equa lly obv ious in the context of a model with constant propriet a ry costs 
(e.g. , model #1). For example, with constant proprietary costs, the only effect of disclosure is to 
reduce expected net revenues by c. See, for exam ple, corollary 5 of Verrecchia [1990a] . 
78Jn conjunction with model #3, see Clinch and Verrecchia [1 997]. 
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mization over a firm's ex pected value, consider the following alternative characteri-
zation of price. Now I assume that t here are t wo informed firms, the first of which 
sells its goods in a p rod uct market in which demand is character ized by a price 
P, = a + (JY - x, - ! Xz , and the second of which sells its goods in a product mar-
ket in which demand is characterized by P2 = a+ (JY - 1 x 1 - Xz, where 1 can be 
thought t o represent either the degree to which the products are subst itutes or the 
competitiveness between the two product markets. For example , here 1 = 0 indicates 
no compet ition between the two firms (i.e ., each firm ha s a monopoly on the good 
that it produces), w hile 1 = 1 indicates that both firms produce identical goods. Set 
Y = fh + f)z. Here I assume that the first firm observes (exclusively) fh = Yl, while 
the second firm observes (exclusively ) Y2 = yz, where f/1 a nd f/2 are both d ist ributed 
uniformly between -k and k. Unlike before, however, I make no assumption about 
the relation a m ong a, {3, and k . 
As before, each firm faces a sequence of two decisions: w hether to disclose its 
information concerning that elem ent of total demand (i.e., Y ) known t o it (i.e ., Yl in 
the case of the first firm and Y2 in the case of the second), and, subsequently, what 
quantity of output to produce (i.e ., x, and Xz). As is st anda rd in a Cournot setting, 
I assum e t hat each firm chooses its optimal qua nt ity based on its own information 
p lus the information voluntarily supplied by, perhaps, its competitor. In addition, I 
assume that each firm chooses an equilibrium reporting strategy based on rational 
inferences about w ithheld information . Unlike models # 1 and #2, however, here 
I assume t hat each firm chooses the quantity t hat it produces solely to maximize 
expected revenue, and not current value. In other words, here market expectat ions 
of current value play no role . 
Also in contrast w ith models #1 and #2, here I allow for negative pnces and 
82 
negative quantities: that is, all of P1 , Pz, x 1, and xz can assume any values along the 
real line. The existence of negative prices and quantit ies requires special interpreta-
tion, and is not benign in the nat ure of the disclosure equilibrium I describe below. 
In effect, if P1 > 0, then firm 1 can produce a positive quantity x1 > 0 for positive 
revenue of x1P1 > 0. Alternat ively, if P1 < 0, then firm 1 can produce a negative 
quantity X 1 < 0 for positive revenue of x 1P1 > 0 . One way to interpret negative 
quantities that lead to positive revenue is that they characterize circumstances in 
which a firm is paid a fee for storing , or withdrawing from t he market, a good with 
socially undesirable features (e.g., surplus grain, radioactive waste materials , etc.) . 
One consequence of negative prices and negative quant ities is t hat , unlike model #2, 
the equilibrium does not unravel. Specifically, in this model one can show that a 
unique equilibrium exists in which firm i discloses Yi when it is in the interval 
where Yi solves 
and withholds Yi otherwise. Not e that a necessary condition for the existence of 
such an interval is that 0 < Yi < 4 13~ . In other words, any potential equilibrium 
disclosure policy must involve disclosing realizations of Yi that form an int erval that 
straddles 0, the unconditional expected value of Yi. St ated somewhat differently, 
a (potential) disclosure equilibrium consist s of withholding "dra matic news" (i.e., 
realizations of Yi in the tails of their distribution) and disclosing "anticipated news" 
(i.e., realizations of Yi surrounding its uncondit ional mean) . To understand this result, 
not e that firm i is indifferent between disclosure and non-disclosure when Yi = Yi 
because j ' s expectations remain unchanged whether Yi is disclosed or not. Now if 
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firm i observes Yi > f)i and does not disclose, firm j will set its production levels based 
on it expectations (i.e., f); ), whereas i will know that demand is greater and hence be 
able to exploit underproduction by its rival. This explains why i hides realizat ions of 
Yi greater than f);. In contrast, as realizations move below f);, firm i initially suffers 
from non-disclosure for exactly the opposite reason: that is , firm j sets production too 
high relative to i's knowledge of demand conditions, pushing prices down for both 
firms. This results in firm i disclosing realizations of Yi immediately below f); . But , as 
realizations get further below f};, firm i also reacts by reducing its production levels; 
this dissipates the relative negative impact of non-disclosure. Furthermore, when 
realizations of y; are sufficiently below Yi, firm i benefits from j 's overproduction: 
in effect, i benefits from j's inclination to overproduce at a time of low demand 
because i can earn positive revenue by choosing a negative quantity X; in conjunction 
with a negative price. As a result, firm i withholds Yi values substantially below j's 
expectations. 
To digress briefly, one appealing notion of this m odel is that it promulgates the 
notion of a ''U-shaped" disclosure region: informat ion in the tails is withheld while 
"ant icipated new s" is disclosed. Prima facie, as a characterization of discretionary 
disclosure in real institutional settings, this has some appeal. More importantly, 
with this model we can address the relation between disclosure and competition. 
Specifically, one can show that both the size of the disclosure region and the (ex 
ante) probability of disclosure decrease as the degree of competition, as manifest in 
[, increases.79 In other words, at least in this model, m ore competition implies less 
disclosure. But remember t hat as appealing as these features may be, nonetheless 
they are artifacts of a particular model. Features cont rary to these a re just as likely 
79See, for example, corollary 1 of Clinch and Verrecchia [1 997]. 
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to occur in models with different, but equally appealing, assumptions. 
Furthermore, regardless of how we feel about this particular model, note that it is 
still the case that there exist ex ante precommitment arrangements (i.e., arrangements 
before the information arrives) that dominate allowing the managers and/ or t he firm 
the discretion to disclose ex post (i.e., after Yi and Yj are observed). For example, if 
competition between the two firms is not severe, both firms do better by precommit-
ting to a policy of full disclosure in advance of receiving their information.80 In other 
words, despite the advantages of mo del # 3 over the two prior models as a charac-
terization of discretionary disclosure, it does not reconcile completely discretionary 
disclosure arrangements with ex ante disclosure choices. 
Before concluding this essay, it is useful to explore the role of one, final a ssumption 
maintained throughout models #1-3: if the manager and/or firm chooses to dissem-
inate his private information, he does so truthfully. As alluded t o in the survey of 
prior research on disclosure, there has been some attempt in the literat ures of both 
accounting and economics to understand the implications of relaxing this assumption. 
These attempts fall under the broad auspices of "cheap-talk" games. 
Disclosure in "Cheap-Talk" Settings (Model #4).81 Consider a duopolis-
tic setting where one firm observes some proprietary, non-verifiable information Y 
about the next period's price of a product that it produces, but its competitor does 
not. Assume that Y is a realization of a random variable Y distributed uniformly 
between 0 and 1. The informed firm wishes to send a message, m, where m is some 
element on the real line, about Y to its competitor so that t hey can coordinate bet-
ter their production levels. Despite an intent t o coordinate production levels, I also 
SOBy not "too severe," I mean specifically 1 < 2 (viz - 1): see corollary 2 of Clinch and Verrecchia 
[1997]. 
81ln conjunction with model #4, see Crawford and Sobel [1982]. 
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assume that because of some element of (unmodeled) competition between the firms, 
firms' interests are misaligned. Specifically, the informed firm chooses m t o maximize 
- (y- (f + b)) 2 , whereas the competit or chooses yto maximize- (y- Y) 2 , where 
y denotes t he uninformed firm' s expectation of Y given the informed firm's message 
m, and an exogenous parameter b (b -1- 0) reflects the extent t o which firms ' interests 
are a ligned.82 In cont rast to prior m odels , t he salient feature of this game is t hat 
the message chosen by the informed firm, in the sense of a m essage m , and how the 
uninformed compet itor chooses to implement this message, in the sense of choosing 
a y, are wholly endogenous: this is what is meant by t he expression "cheap-talk." In 
ot her words, there is no requirement that the informed firm truthfully report; sim-
ilarly, t here is no requirement that an uninformed competitor accept t he informed 
firm's message at face value (i.e., as a truthful disclosure). 
As it happens, all equilibria in this communication game are part ition equilibria. 
That is, in a partition equilibrium t he informed firm partit ions t he support of the 
private information Y = Y into N element s, { ao (N ) = 0, ... ,a; (N), ... ,aN (N) = 1 }, 
where 1 :::; N:::; N (b), and sends a message revealing the int erval containing Y = Y, 
say a message claiming that Y E (a; (N ) , ai+1 (N)). The firm does not communicate, 
however, it s full knowledge of the realization of Y = Y. The uninformed firm, upon 
receiving this (noisy) message, int erprets this m essage (correctly) as suggesting that 
the conditional expectation of Y is Y = a;(N ) +;'+1 (N) . In other words, on the one 
hand the informed firm sends a message that is "t ruthful" in t he sense that it does 
not misrepresent the interval in which Y lies, but t he message is nonetheless ''vague." 
On the other hand, the uninformed firm chooses to interpret the message "correctly" 
82The informed firm (perfectly) observes Y = Y in this setting. Fisc~er and Stocken [2000] consider 
a setting where the informed firm has imperfect infor':?ation about Y = Y. They establish t hat the 
quality of the uninformed firm 's information about Y = Y is maximized when the informed firm 
has coarse or im perfect informat ion. 
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in that the conditional expectation of Y is indeed a;(N )+;;+ , (N) when Y is uniformly 
distributed in the interval ( a i ( N ) , ai + 1 ( N))). Note the role misaligned interests 
play in determining equilibria. T he maximum amount of informat ion that can be 
communicated potentially in equilibrium, measured using the residual variance of Y 
that the uninformed firm expects a fter hearing the equilibrium m essage, decreases 
as the misalignment of the competing firms' incentives, b, increases . For example, 
when b = 0 there is no misalignment and full revelation results (in equilibrium) . 
Alt ernatively, when b -----t oo, misalignment is total and there is no possibility of 
communicating a ny information between the informed and uninformed. 
In the context of t he discussion above, the interesting feat ure of a "cheap-talk" 
equilibr ium is that despite the fact that t he informed firm's disclosure is non-verifiable 
and without cost, t he informed firm sends a message, albeit noisy, t o the uninformed 
firm for all realizat ions of Y . T his result differs from the equilibria characterized for 
models #1-3 where for som e realizations of Y disclosu re occurs, whereas for others it 
does not. In short, a "cheap-talk" equilibrium comports nicely with the notion that 
in practice managers and/or firms comment on everything, but in a fashion whereby 
proprietary information is always disclosed with some element of vagueness . 
Summary. While I have alluded t o many d eficiencies in t he context of the 
discretionary-based disclosure literature, t he provocative feature of t his literature 
is that it has cha nged t he way researchers in accounting think about disclosure, while 
at the same t ime offering conclusions that seem immediate. The main conclusion is 
particularly compelling: in t he presence of costs and/or uncertainty, broadly defined, 
managers will elect t o disclose or wit hhold information about firm value despite the 
fact that agents outside t he firm interpret withheld information rationally. In other 
words, this literature tells a compelling economic story a bout the incentives on the 
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part of the manager or firm to disclose voluntarily. This strength seems t o overcome 
weaknesses that include: a reliance on the assumptions in some models that ma nagers 
seek to maximize current market value (as opposed to future value) and truthfully 
report; the fact that results in the literature are highly sensitive to assumptions; and 
that discretionary disclosure strategies, per se, are typically inefficient in that the firm 
does better by precommitting never to disclose. But having alluded to the potential 
inefficiency of discretionary-based disclosure models, let me use this as a segue t o the 
next essay. 
4 Efficiency-Based Disclosure 
What disclosure arrangements or strategies are preferred unconditionally: t hat is, 
without prior knowledge of the information? As has been discussed previously, 
association-based research is premised on the notion that disclosure is exogenous. 
Discretionary-based research posits endogenous disclosure arrangements, but with no 
requirement that they be preferred ex ante. Therefore, having discussed those two 
topics in some detail, this is an opportune time to ask whether there exist disclosure 
arrangements that would also have this feature. In the context of this discussion, I 
refer t o such arrangement s as "efficient" : that is, efficient disclosure arrangements 
are those that are preferred unconditionally. Notions of efficiency are central to 
economics. Therefore, if one objective of the disclosure literature is to forge a link 
between financial reporting and economics, failure to integrate efficiency into the 
discussion may be a fatal oversight. 
This is not to suggest that discussions of t he relation between disclosure and 
efficiency have never entered the domain of accounting research. Arguably, the ear-
liest theory -based, economic analyses of disclosure in capital markets concerned how 
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disclosure affected a n economy's social welfare in pure excha nge economies.83 In par-
ticular, early work examined t he extent t o which (unconditional) disclosure choice 
achieved (weak) Pareto improvements in markets of perfect competition and p ure 
exchange: that is, circumstances in wh ich the disclosure yielded no productive ben-
efits on its own account . T h is early literature, and much of the controversy this 
work engendered, has been discussed previously.84 Nonetheless, it is useful t o review 
b riefly some of t he themes in this early literature as a segue into m ore cont emporary 
thought. 
Pareto improvement is a very strong welfare criterion in a pu re exchange economy 
setting. In the context of disclosure and even in its weakest form (i.e. , weak Pareto 
improvement), it requires that disclosure make no investor agent who participates in 
t he market worse off even in the event that other market participants unambiguously 
benefit. From t he very start, P a ret o improvement, pure exchange, and disclosure 
seemed incompatible. One reason for this is t hat disclosure benefits t he less well 
informed at t he ex pense of the better informed. But a nother, and perhaps more 
subtle, reason is that the assumption of perfect competition in combination with 
pure exchange leaves little opport unity for disclosure to yield a benefit. 
To understand this last point, recall from t he first essay t hat perfect com pet i-
t ion assumes that each investor agent behaves as if his or her actions or behav iors 
have no effect on price, and in equilibrium t his conjecture is true. Perfect compe-
tit ia n is achieved typically by assuming that the number of investor agent s is la rge 
(say, count a bly infinite) . T his ensures that while prices reflect the com bined deci-
83See , for example, the trio of papers Ng [1975, 1977] and Hakannson, et al. [1982] . Note that while 
these papers were published in finance journals, the a uthors themselves held account ing faculty ap-
pointments at the time of their publication, and hence these papers a re representative of accounting 
thought a t that time. This is also true of the Kunkel [1982] , a pa p er cited in a subsequent footnote. 
84See Verrecchia [1982b]. 
89 
sions of all market participants at an aggregate level, the actions of each individual 
agent have no effect on price because of his or her atomistic feature. By all accounts 
perfect competition is a reasonable assumption about markets that are deep and/or 
assets that are widely traded. Its role in welfare analyses, however, is not benign. 
When markets a re perfectly competitive, disclosure's primary effect is t o redistrib-
ute wealth among market participants. For example, consider the consequences of a 
"good news" disclosure concerning the value of an asset. A "good news" disclosure 
makes individuals who are overweighted in that asset bet ter off and individua ls who 
are underweighted in that a sset worse off (where the notions of overweight and un-
derweight are relative to some norm, such as t heir per-capita share of the risky asset 
absent different beliefs or ex pectations about the asset's uncertain value). Similarly, 
"bad news" disclosures do the reverse. Thus, to t he extent to which markets are 
populated by agents who are risk-averse, a consequence of an anticipated disclosure 
is that it makes market participants collectively worse off (in expectation). This is 
referred to as the adverse risk -sharing effect of increased disclosure. Of course, in com-
plete markets where all anticipated events can be contracted over through trading in 
advance of the events, effectively market participants can insure themselves against 
adverse risk-sharing consequences. But this would only ensure t hat disclosure has no 
beneficial role in markets t hat are complete, in conjunction with a debilitating role 
in market s that a re less than p erfectly complet e. Consequently, these results inclined 
much early research to conclude that the benefits of disclosure were at best illusive, 
and at worst harmful. 85 
It should come as no surpnse to suggest that researchers were less than fully 
85See, for example, the discussions in Hirshleifer [1971] and Marshall [1974]. For example, Marsha ll 
[1974, p.380] states: "If the impact of information is insured before its arriva l, that insurance 
precludes further trade based on the news .. .ln the contrary case when the news must arrive before 
its impact is insured in a preliminary market, the information is harmful." 
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satisfied with this conclusion, and interest in a welfare role for disclosure remained 
keen. At this juncture, however, the literature seems t o have bifurcated down two 
distinct paths . The first path was t o suggest t hat the problem lay with the maintained 
assumption of a p ure exchange economy. That is, if one allowed for production and 
exchange, t here existed conditions under which disclosure would be preferred because 
altered production plans lead to more efficient allocation of resources across time and 
firms. 86 In effect, this research path suggested sufficient condit ions for disclosure 
t o yield P a reto improvements when employed in conjunction wit h production. The 
second pat h was to suggest that the problem lay with t he maintained assumption 
of costless private informat ion acquisition. That is, a welfare role for disclosure 
could be posit ed in an exclusively pure exchange economy by suggesting that one 
pot ential benefit from costless public disclosure is that it may preclude costly private 
information acquis it ion.87 In effect, t his research path explored whet her, by reducing 
or eliminating incentives t o become privately informed at some cost, costless public 
disclosure made investors bet ter off d espite adverse risk-sharing effects. 
The t wo papers most representative of these two research paths were published 
in the same (very prominent) journal within a few years of one a nother.88 D espit e 
this, the one that suggest ed that the problem lay wit h t he m aintained assumption 
of pure excha nge seems to have fallen into obscurity, w hereas the one that suggest ed 
that the problem lay with the m aintained assumption of costless p rivat e information 
acquisition spawned considerable interest, especia lly a mong accounting researchers.89 
W hy? If I were permitted t o speculate (and here I am truly speculat ing and not 
86See Kunkel [1982]. 
87See , Verrecchia [1982b; specificaly, pp . 29-37] and Diamond [1985]. 
88Kunkel [1982] and Diamond [1985], respectively: both were published in the Journal of Finance. 
89Work in ac=unting inspired by Diamond's [1985] paper includes Bushman [1991], Indjejikian 
[1991], Lundholm [1991], and Alles and Lundholm [1993]. To give some indication of how quickly 
Kunkel's work fell into obscurity, note that Diamond [1985] does not even cite Kunkel [1982], despite 
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offering a critique of the papers), my explanation would be that researchers had 
long recognized that production militates against all potential debilitating effects of 
disclosure, including adverse risk sharing.9° Consequently, the path that promoted 
disclosure as a device to yield social value in production and exchange economies 
was deemed insufficiently provocative. Alternatively, paths that promoted a utility 
for disclosure in (exclusively) pure exchange settings remained popular because they 
appeared to be addressing the "disclosure paradox": that is, explaining why it was not 
the case that more disclosure was bad, and not good.91 Consequently, this remained 
the primary focus of research endeavors in accounting.92 
Despite the popularity of work that promoted disclosure as a device to thwart the 
acquisition of costly private information, the research itself was not immune from crit-
icism. Subsequent work questioned whether it actually solved the "paradox." Let me 
mention three concerns. First, if one makes market agents (e.g., investors, sharehold-
ers, etc.) sufficiently diverse, it is difficult , if not impossible, for disclosure to yield a 
positive benefit for everyone. Consequently, the results of this path only seem to have 
applied to settings in which investor agents were fairly homogeneous. For example, 
an important paper in this literature shows that better informed shareholders in a 
firm always prefer less firm disclosure than less well-informed shareholders .93 This is 
due to heterogeneity in the adverse risk-sharing and beneficial cost-saving effects of 
the fact that Diamond's work is in the same journal and published only three years later. 
90For example, more than a decade before Kunkel [1982], Hirshleifer [1971, p .567] had emphasized 
this point: "Pu blic info rmation ... is indeed of soci al valu e in a regime of producti on and exchange," 
[original emphasis]. 
91For example, Marshall [1974, p. 382] states: "The argument has been that public information 
is valueless and private information valuable, leading to inefficient allocation of resources by over-
spending on information. This might imply a policy of suppressing these kinds of information ... the 
logic is compelling ... but it seems a paradox that more information should be bad instead of good ... " 
[emphasis added]. 
920noe again, see Bushman [1991], Indjejikian [1991], Lundholm [1991], and Alles and Lundholm 
[1993]. 
93See Kim [1993]. 
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disclosure among shareholders with different risk tolerances and different information 
acquisition cost functions. 94 Second, one technical feature common to all the papers 
in this area is that they are single-period models. That is, the decision to publicly 
disclose is made in conjunction with the decision to acquire private information, the 
decision to rebalance one's portfolio, etc. As alluded to in the first essay, assessing the 
effects of disclosure in the context of a single period model of trade risks commingling 
a host of factors that may obfuscate or obscure disclosure's role.95 Third, this work 
ignores the possibility that when public disclosure is costly and firms compete for 
shareholders' attention, firms may actually have an incentive to disclose too much 
information: that is , more than the socially optimal amount.96 
The Information Asymmetry Component of the Cost of Capital. Allow 
me to summarize the discussion to this point. What started out originally as a litera-
ture that sought normative prescriptions for Pareto improvements among all investor 
agents who participate in the economy metamorphosed into one of individual firms 
making disclosure choices t o maximize t he expected utilit ies of exclus ively their own 
shareholders. It remained the case, however, that the focus of the efficiency literature 
continued to be on markets that were perfectly competitive. Allowing for the fact that 
changing the maintained assumption from one of pure exchange t o one of production 
and exchange may yield efficiency gains that offer a rationale for disclosure, for the 
remainder of this essay I explore an alternative way t o link disclosure to efficiency. 
Specifically, I explore what happens when one changes the maintained assumption 
94Jn effect, Kim (1993] shows t hat the results in Verrecchia (1982b] and Diamond's (1985] rely 
critically on investors having homogeneous economic features. Indjejikian (1991, p.294] acknowledges 
the role of homogeneity in his work: he states, "The high degree of investor homogeneity is an 
unfortunate limitation of this [i.e., his] study." 
95See specifically my discussion of the motivat ion for model #4 in the first essay. This limita tion 
was widely acknowledged: see, e.g. , Bushman [1991]. Nonetheless, some papers, e.g., Alles and 
Lundholm (1993], also discuss why they do not believe it to be a fatal flaw . 
96See, for example, Fishman a nd Hagerty (1989]. 
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from one of p erfect com p etition to one of imperfect com pet ition. 
In primary capital markets, equit y sha res of a firm are sold t o invest ors t o raise 
cash proceeds for investment . One disclosure-related cost t hat inhibits investment and 
hence makes firm equit y sales more costly is a t ransaction cost t hat arises from the 
adverse-selection problem inherent in t he excha nge of assets a mong investor agent s 
of vary ing degrees of informed ness. I refer to this t ransaction cost as t he "infor-
mation asymmetry com p onent of the cost of capital." The informat ion asymmetry 
component of t he cost of capital is the discount t hat firms p rov ide as a means of 
accommodating the adverse-selection problem. As such, it does not manifest it self 
in perfectly compet itive m arkets because t here is no adverse-selection: the purchase 
a nd sale of firm equit ies by individual, invest or agent s has no effect on price. In 
other words, perfect competit ion ensures t hat a well informed investor will b e a ble 
t o exchange assets with a less well informed agent, without being pena lized in any 
way by the fact t hat, on average, the former will always profit at the expense of the 
latter. Alt ernatively, in mod els of im perfect competition , t he actions or behaviors of 
each investor are assumed t o b e sufficiently substantive in relation to t he m arket as 
a whole as t o guarant ee that t hese actions will have a n effect on the price at which 
trades a re execut ed . In short, the salient feat ure of imperfect competition is that a ll 
invest or agents may be required t o pay or offer som e "liquidity premium" when assets 
are exchanged, so as to protect t hose on the other s ide of the transaction against the 
adverse-selection p rob lem inherent in the ex change of assets amon g different agent s 
wit h va rying degrees of inform edness . All agents pay or offer t he liquidity premium 
beca use it is assumed that market ''type" (i.e., the extent of an agent's informed -
ness) is unknown or u nobservable. In effect, a liquidity premium is a transaction cost 
a bsorbed by all agent -types, independent of how well or poorly informed each is in 
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relation t o the market as a whole. 
If investors hold their sha res u ntil the firm liquidated, t hey should be unconcerned 
ab out how transaction costs that arise from the exchange of asset shares prior to liq -
uidation will affect their proceeds . If, however, investors anticipate that they may 
sell some shares prior to liquidation, or buy addit ional shares (through, say, dividend 
reinvestment programs or otherwise), then they should factor these transaction costs 
into what t hey a re willing to pay to hold shares init ially. The higher the anticipated 
transaction costs , the less investors will pay initially, and hence the lower the pro-
ceeds a firm receives for investment and pro duction when shares of the firm were sold 
in a primary capital market. Consequently, in t he interests of efficiency it is t o the 
firm' s advantage to reduce inform at ion asymmetry so as to reduce the information 
asymmetry component of the cost of capital. One way t o achieve informat ion asym-
metry reduction is for the firm to commit to the highest level of public disclosure 
at the t ime shares in the firm are first offered. Specifically, the firm could commit 
t o preparing its financial statements using : t he most tra nsparent set of accounting 
standards (e.g ., a multi-national firm electing the standards of the International Ac-
counting St andards Committee versus some less transparent alt ernative) ; the most 
transparent procedures within a particular set of standards (e.g., purchase versus 
pooling, capital leases versus operating leases); or listing on exchanges that attract 
the great est a na lyst or investor following (e.g ., the New York Stock Exchange versus 
the American Stock Exchange) . 
A Modeling Vignette on Disclosure and the Cost of Capital. 97 To sum-
marize the discussion so far, my proposal for linking disclosure to efficiency is t hrough 
the information asymmetry component of t he cost of capital. But what exactly does 
97Jn conjunction with this v ignette, see Dia mond and Verrecchia [1991] and Baiman and Verrecchia 
[1996]. 
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one mean by the expression "information asymmet ry component of t he cost of cap-
ital" ? What I mean by this expression is t he factor by which investors discount 
firm equity offerings in anticipation of t ransaction costs t hat may arise from adverse 
selection; t hese are tra nsaction cost s tha t original, equity-holder investors must bea r 
in the event t hat they liquidate their equit y holdings at som e future d ate. T he factor 
by which investors discount firm equity offerings t o accommodat e these tra nsactions 
costs makes investment by t he firm more costly. While I believe that my ex pla nation 
of the "informat ion asymmet ry component of the cost of capit al" is cogent, by the 
sa me t oken I am aware of t he fact t hat this is a term t hat lends itself t o disparat e 
int erpret ations. Consequent ly, the purpose of t he following vignet te is t o illustrat e 
this concept in a n example t hat retains some of t he same spirit a nd flavor of vignettes 
from previous essays. 
Of course, if a firm benefits from a commitment t o greater d isclosure through the 
reduction in its cost of capit al, then why would t here be an inform at ion asymm etry 
cost component ? In other words, what would preclude a firm from choosing t he cor-
ner solution of full disclosure, thereby eliminating any pot ential cost? P resuma bly, 
managers and/or firms do not choose the full-disclosure corner solution because there 
are costs t hat counterva il against t hat choice. In t he lit erature, exa m ples of coun-
tervailing economic forces that lead t o interior d isclosure choices (i.e ., less t han full 
disclosure) include risk sharing a nd agency costs.98 Interestingly, however , nowhere 
in the literat ure can one find a d iscussion predicat ed on what is perha ps the most 
obvious dev ice to ensure an int erior solution: prop riet a ry costs. Consequently, a n 
ancillary purpose of this exa m ple is t o show how prop rietary costs work in this con-
98See Dia mond and Verrecchia [1991] for the former and Baiman and Verrecchia [1996] for t he la t ter. 
Of course, in the absence of any cou ntervailing force, nothing precludes full disclosure from becoming 
the corner solution. See, for example, Bushman, et al. [1996] (see also Verrecchia [1996a]). The 
issue of corner solutions is also discussed in Verrecchia [1999]. 
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text. In short, the motivation for t he following vignette is to illustrate the concept 
of the information asymmetry component of t he cost of capital and to show how the 
ex istence of proprietary costs may lead to a disclosure policy in the interior (that is, 
disclose in some circumst ances, and withhold in others). 
Consider an entrepreneur w ho owns t he process to sell a good in a market in 
which t here is another competit or. To initiat e the manufactur ing process, however, 
in the first period t he entrepreneur needs to raise C dollars of capit al. To ra ise the 
capital, t he entrepreneur offers to sell a percentage Q of the firm to a risk-neutral 
investor. The entrepreneur's objective is t o maximize his return from ow ning part 
of the firm's revenue generating activities after selling Q percent of the firm t o the 
investor in exchange for C dollars of capital. I int erpret that part of the firm's revenue 
generating activ ities t hat the entrepreneur sells off as his cost of capital. 
To begin , I reintroduce the Cournot duopoly product market game discussed in 
model # 3 in the previous essay (wit h perfect compet ition , i.e ., 1 = 1 ) . E ach firm 
invests in the current period in producing some good , in a nt icipation of the fact that 
the good will sell for a price P in a future period (say, the second period), w here P 
is represented by 
P = a + {3Y - X e - X 0 , 
where a and f3 are fixed , positive const a nts, Y is some proprieta ry informat ion about 
the anticipated price that is known only to the entrepreneur, a nd Xe and X 0 are 
the amounts produced by t he ent repreneu r's firm and t he other firm, respectively. 
Each firm makes a decision as to what to produce without knowledge of the amount 
the other firm produces. Also as before I represent Y as a random variable that I S 
uniformly distributed between - k and k . 
A factor that affects a n investor's decision to invest with the entrepreneur is t hat 
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she anticipat es a liquidity shock with probability t in t he second period t o either 
purchase or sell one share of the firm. After the C dollars of init ial capital are raised, 
purchases or sales of sha res in the entrepreneur's firm t a ke place in a secondary 
market. The secondary market is populated by equal numbers of informed t raders 
who also know Y = Y and uninformed , or liq uid ity traders, who have no knowledge 
of Y = Y unless t his information is disclosed by the entrepreneur. And in all cases, 
trading is restricted to buying or selling one share in t he firm. 
Trades for firm shares in the secondary ma rket a re executed by a large number of 
market makers, each of whom has the responsibility of executing one demand order 
(to buy or sell one share) in t he second period. Market makers also do not know 
Y = Y unless it is disclosed, a nd I assume that with probability ! a market ma ker 
ex ecutes a n informed trader's demand ord er, and with probability ! he execut es an 
uninformed demand order. Consequently, m arket m akers charge a fee to ensure that 
t hey b reak even in executing t rades . This fee can be interpreted as t he "liquidity 
premium" charged for executing trades in the presence of adverse selection. 
To reduce t his liquidity premium a nd make investment in his firm potentially 
more attractive, in the first period t he ent repreneur commits to disclosing Y =Yin 
the second period if Y = Y E [- q, q] and withholding it if Y = Y E [- k, -q] U [q, k ]. 
At an intuitive level, one can t hink of t he entrepreneur's commitment as a decision 
t o disclose "anticipat ed new s" (i.e ., - q :::; Y :::; q) but to wit hhold "dra matic news," 
that is, realizations of Y in the tails of its distribution. 99 Consequently, t he higher 
(lower ) the value of q (keeping in mind t hat 0 :::; q :::; k), the more (less) disclosure 
t o which t he ent repreneur commits. In t he event t hat Y = Y is disclosed, market 
makers do not charge a fee because t here is no information asymmetry. In the event 
99See, once again, Clinch and Verrecchia [1997]. 
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that Y = Y is withheld, however, a liquidity premium is charged. 
The trade-off for the entrepreneur should be clear. In choosing a high q, he chooses 
greater disclosure, makes m arkets more liquid, and thus red uces the information 
asymm etry component of the cost of capital for a potential investor in the prim ary 
market for equity offerings. But also in choosing a h igh q, the entrepreneur increases 
p roprieta ry costs by a llowing his competitor t o choose a more efficient production 
schedule. 
As before, if the entrepreneur discloses Y = Y , both his firm and t he other firm 
produce 
D D 1 
X = X = - (a + (JY) 
e o 3 ' 
and the price at which the goods sell is 
1 
pD = a + (JY - Xe - X 0 = 3(a + (JY) . 
If the entrepreneur does not d isclose Y = Y, t hen t he other firm does not know 
this value. Consequently, because an undisclosed Y is uniformly distributed between 
[ -k, - q] and [q, k], Y (undisclosed) can only be interpreted based on its conditional 
expectation (which is 0) . Therefore, here 
XN 1 1 
-a + - (JY a nd e 3 2 ' 
XN 1 
- a 0 3 ' 
and t he price at which the goods sell is 
N 1 1 P = a + (JY - Xe - X 0 = -a + - (JY. 3 2 
When the entrepreneur d iscloses, he earns revenue of 
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when Y = Y. When t he entrepreneur does not disclose, he earns revenue of 
when Y = Y. To d igress b riefly, note that this implies that independent of other 
considerations, a strategy of never d isclosing always dominat es a strategy of always 
disclosing, because 
E [i~ fJN] ~ ( a 2 + ~j32k2) 
> ~ ( a2 + ~i32k2) 
E[i~ fJD]. 
The policy of disclosing when Y E [ - q, q] and not disclosing when Y E [-k, - q] U[q, k] 
yields expected revenue of 
E [~ (a + /3Y) 2 1Y E [-q, qJ] x Pr (Y E [- q, q]) 
+E [~ (a+ ~J)Y) 2 IY E [-k, - q] U [q, k]l x Pr (Y E [-k, - q] U [q, k]) 
2_ (a2 k + 132 (~ k3 _ .!j_q3)) . 
9k 4 12 
Henceforth defineR (q) = 9~ ( a 2k + /32 (~k3 - 152q3) ) as the entrepreneur's expected 
revenue as a function of his disclosure choice q. Note that expect ed revenue function, 
R (q), is decreasing in q. T his is what one would expect: in the presence of proprietary 
costs expected revenue declines as the entrepreneur elects greater disclosure. 
But another consequence of n ondisclosure is that the ma rket a lso does not know 
Y = Y when Y E [- k , -q] U [q, k ]. Consequently, in t he event of nondisclosure the 
market values the entrepreneur's expected revenue as 
E [x~ PNIY E [- k, - q] u [q, kJ] 
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But informed traders know Y = Y. This implies that whenever Y = Y is not 
disclosed, an informed trader who executes a trade in the second a ry market earns a 
return based on t he difference between the market's expectation of the firm's revenue, 
E[x~ p NIY E [-k, -q] U [q, k]], and t he actual revenue of~ (a+ ~,6Y) 2 . That is, in 
the event of nondisclosure, an informed trader expects t o earn the following amount 
as a function of the entrepreneur's disclosure choice q 
1 r-q 11 ( 3 ) 2 1 ( 3 3 3 ) I A (q) = 2 (k- q) J_k 9 a + 2 ,6Y - 9 cl + 4 ,62l + 4q,62k + 4 ,62k2 dY 
1 1k 11 ( 3 )
2 1 ( 2 3 2 2 3 2 3 2 2) I + - a + - ,6Y - - a + - ,6 q + -q,6 k + -,6 k dY. 2 (k - q) q 9 2 9 4 4 4 
This means that in the event of nondisclosure, market makers must charge each trader 
(equivalently, each transaction) a liquidity premium of ~A (q) so as to break even in 
a market populated by a 50%-50% mix of informed and uninformed traders. 
Now I return to the investor's problem. The investor contributes capital of C and, 
in return, she expects t o receive a percentage Q (q) of the entrepreneur's expected 
revenue, which is R ( q). In addition, with probability t the investor receives a liquidity 
shock to purchase or sell more of the firm. Note that in the event of a liquidity 
shock, the investor purchases or sells shares in the firm at the firm's expected value. 
Consequently, the only effect of a liquidity shock on the investor's expected return 
is that, in addit ion, she must pay the liquidity premium of ~A (q). Assume t hat 
compet ition t o invest in the entrepreneur's firm is perfect; hence, investors can only 
hope to break even when they invest C dollars of capital. Taken toget her, a ll ofthese 
imply t hat the investor's expected payout for investing with the entrepreneur is 
k - q 1 Q (q) R (q) - C- -k-t2A (q), 
where k~qt represents the probability that t he investor receives a liquid ity shock 
during a period in which the entrepreneur happens not to be disclosing. Therefore, 
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t o "break even" in this arrangement, the investor must receive the percentage Q (q), 
where Q (q) is determined by 
( ) _ C + ~t>.(q) _ Q q - R (q) ' 
the entrepreneur receives the residual, 1 - Q (q). T he key feat ure of this analysis is 
that potential invest ors rationa lly anticipate all the benefits a nd costs of investing 
before they purchase equity in the firm. 100 
What disclosure policy choice minimizes the entrepreneur's cost of capital? The 
entrepreneur's return from selling Q (q) percent of the firm t o the investor in exchange 
for C d ollars of capital is 
(1- Q (q)) R (q) ( _ C+ ~t>. (q)) ( ) 1 R (q) R q 
k-q 
R (q) - C-~t). (q ) , 
where the first equality results from the fact t hat the investor only breaks even. 
Consequently, the disclosure choice that minimizes the entrepreneur's cost of capital 
is the one tha t maximizes R (q) - C - k:;;.9t). (q). It is a straightforward exercise to 
show that when the investor is immune from liquidity shocks (i.e., t = 0) , a policy 
of nondisclosure maximizes R (q) - C- k2-;.9 t). (q) (i .e., q = 0) . T his results from the 
fact that R (q) is decreasing in q. Alternatively, consider what happens when t = 0.5. 
To facilitate the solution for the q that minimizes Q (q), assume that a= 0 .5, (3 = 1, 
k = 1, and C = 0 .05 . To illustrate the calculation of). (q) for these parameter values, 
define F (Y, q) and G (q) as 
1 12121 1 F (Y q) = - Y + - Y - -q - -q - -
' 6 4 12 12 12' 
l Oq'his is in contrast with Huddart, et al. [1999], for example. There, equity holders in a firm are 
treated as exogenous, thereby giving them no opportunity to decide whether they want to invest in 
the first place. 
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1 1 ,------
G (q ) = -3 + 3y (3q
2 + 3q + 4), 
respectively. Together, t hese imply that ).. (q) is defined as 
1 (1-q 1G(q) 11 ) ).. (q ) = - 2 ( ) F (Y, q) dY + F (Y, q) dY- F (Y, q) dY k - q -1 q G(q) 
for a ll q E [0, 0.5], whereas 
).. (q) =- ( 1 ) (1-q F (Y, q) dY- { 1 F (Y, q) dY) 
2 k - q -1 }q 
for all q E [0.5, 1]. Using this expression for ).. (q), one can show that R (q) - C -
k;qt ).. (q) is maximized at q = 0. 37979. In other words, the entrepreneur's return is 
maximized when the marginal benefit of disclosure equals the marginal cost (through 
propriet ary cost s) ; this occurs a t q = 0. 37979 .101 In addition, at t h is value the 
invest or receives Q (0. 37979) = 62% of the revenue generating activ ities of the firm, 
while t he ent repreneur reta ins 38%. This implies that t he entrepreneur's cost of 
capit al is Q (0 . 37979) x R (0. 37979) = 0.068; it compares with a cost of C = 0.05 in 
the absence of an adverse selection problem (which occurs when)..= 0) . Consequently, 
in this exa mple the information asymmet ry component of the cost of capital is the 
difference, which is 0.018 . 
To summarize this example, its purpose is to illustrate the concept of the in-
formation asymmetry component of the cost of capit al. The cost of capital is the 
percentage of the firm an entrepreneur must sell t o raise a fixed amount of capita l. 
The information asymmetry component of the cost of capita l is the d ifference in the 
101 determined the value of q that maximizes R (q) - C - ~t). (q) by plotting this function using 
the para meters values a= 0.5, f3 = 1, 1 = 1, k = 1, C = 0 .05 a nd t = 0.5, observing that it is 
concave over the ra nge q E [0, 1] for t hese values, and t hen noting that the only value fo r w hich 
ddq ( R (q) - C - ~t). (q)) = 0 over q E [0, 1] is q = 0.37979. A more = mplet e proof requires 
show ing that the function R (q) - C - ~t). (q) is concave over q E [0, k] for some general class 
of pa rameter values , and then determining the q tha t maximizes the function for t hose pa rameter 
values . 
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cost of capital in t he presence versus a bsence of an adverse selection p roblem t hat 
arises from informat ion asymmetry. In effect , it results as a consequence of the entre-
preneur's inabilit y t o commit to a policy of full disclosure because of the presence of 
other, d isclosure-related costs (e.g ., proprietary cost s) . An ancillary purpose of the 
vignette is t o show how liquidity premia in combination wit h p roprietary costs may 
lead to efficient disclosu re choices in which the firm neither fully discloses, nor tot ally 
withholds, information. Specifically, in the example a bove the entrepreneur commits 
t o som e disclosure so as t o mitigate problems arising from illiquid markets . He does 
not , however, commit to full disclosure because the proprietary costs that arise from 
this action are too high. Nor, for t hat matter, does he suppress all disclosure, a s this 
would drive up his cost of capital precipitously. 
Before concluding, let me discuss t he role of one last maintained assumption. 
This vignette, and indeed my ent ire discussion throughout this essay, presumes t hat 
a commitment to more disclosure lea ds to less information asymmetry, and this pre-
sumption is not without controversy. For example, recall m odel #6 in the first essay. 
In that model disclosure was represented by y = u + ~; in addit ion it was assumed 
that investors also possessed private information about ~' in the form of Oi = ~ - wi, 
where the w;'s have a normal dist ribution with mean 0 and precisions W ;. Here, greater 
disclosure exacerbates (as opposed t o ameliorat es) inform ation asymmetry among in-
vestors.102 Thought of som ewhat loosely, t his characterizat ion treats disclosure and 
private information gat hering, and hence information asymmetry, as complements, 
not substitutes. While models tha t posit a posit ive relation between disclosure and 
information asymmetry are no m ore or less valid t han those that posit a negative rela-
tion , the former typically speak t o a type of transitory behavior that may arise around 
lOgee, for example, Kim a nd Verrecchia [1994] and Bushman, et al. [1997]. 
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the brief window of an anticipated disclosure (e.g., an earnings announcement) , and 
not to commitments t o greater disclosure over longer windows. Alternat ively, the 
discussion in this essay speaks specifically to commitments t o greater disclosure over 
longer windows. In short, the discussion here maintains as an assumption the notion 
that a commitment t o greater disclosure degrades the private benefits of information 
gathering, and hence reduces information asymmetry. 
Summary. While this essay reviews a variety of work that has attempt ed t o link 
efficiency to disclosure, either in the context of social welfare or single-firm efficiency, 
in my opinion the one with the greatest potential is the link between disclosure and 
the information asymmetry reduction. To date there is very little research on this 
t opic, either theory- or empirical-based. One explanat ion for the paucity of research 
is that establishing a link is difficult, especially in empirical studies.103 Even in the 
"simple" modeling vignette offered above (wit h all its stylized assumptions) , the link 
is fa r from transparent . Of course, an a lternative explanation is that researchers a re 
simply not aware of the issue. To the extent to which this is the case, perhaps this 
document will serve as a ra llying cry for more work on this topic. But in view of 
the fact that the discussion has turned to the t opic of directions for future research, 
perhaps it is appropriate to ma ke our way to the final section of this paper. 
5 Directions for Future Research 
What research activity do I hope this document will encourage in t he future? Hav ing 
alluded t o the absence of a comprehensive t heory in the introduction, t his would 
certainly be a worthwhile outcome. To be truly comprehensive, however, a theory 
lOSome empirical-based work that has attempted to link disclosure and cost of capital includes 
Welker [1995], Botosan [1997], Healy, et al. [1999], and Leuz and Verrecchia [2000]. 
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must embrace efficiency, incentives, a nd the endogeneit y of the market process as it 
involves interactions among diverse invest or agents. For exam ple, I view research that 
examines incentives t o disclose in markets comprised of a s ingle, representative trader 
(e.g. , discretionary-based disclosure studies) as no more or less "comprehensive" than 
those that endogenize t he market and treat disclosure a s exogenous (e.g., association-
based disclosure) . Both approaches only look at one piece of the overall disclosure 
puzzle. 
M y suggestion for linking disclosure to efficiency, incentives, and the endogeneity 
of the market process is through the reduction in t he information asymmetry com-
ponent of the cost of capital. Information asymmetry inhibits investment, thereby 
making it m ore costly for a firm to engage in those activities for which it has been 
incorpora ted. As d iscussed in the previous essay, a commitment t o greater disclosure 
reduces information asymmetry ; this, in turn, lowers that component of a firm's cost 
of capital t hat arises from information asy mmetry. In short, information asymmetry 
reduction provides a rationale for efficient disclosure choice. In this sense it may be 
the nat ural progeny of early efficiency work in accounting that att empted to find 
sufficient conditions for disclosure . W hether or not one accepts the latter, t he notion 
of increasing m arket liquidity through information asymmetry reduction seems prima 
facie consistent wit h the language regulat ors often use when they describe t he role of 
accountin g standards as one of "leveling the playing field" and increasing "investor 
confidence." 104 As Arthur Levitt st ates: 
"high quality accounting st andards result in great er investor confidence, 
which improves liquidity, reduces capital costs, and makes market prices 
possible." 105 
l D$ee Sutton [1997]. 
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I interpret this statement as speaking to the notion that a commitment t o higher qual-
ity disclosure is efficient in that it leads to a reduction in the information asymmetry 
component of the cost of ca pital. 
I hasten to add, however , that none of my discussion is intended to suggest t hat 
no other vehicles exist to integrate the theory of disclosure comprehensively. May 
the proverbial "thousand flowers bloom": if there exist more successful approaches 
for linking disclosure t o efficiency, I will not be displeased. If this document inspires 
such a treatise, I will have some claim to paternity. 
But another pot ent ial research activ ity that I hope will result from this document 
is empirical work that forges a link between disclosure and its economic consequences. 
While I am interest ed in all such links, let me suggest again that the one with the 
greatest potential may be t he link between disclosure and information asymmetry 
reduction. While it may strike a read er as unusual for the author of paper on theory -
based models t o be promulgating t he idea of more empirical research on t he economic 
consequences of disclosure, I would like t o see more empirical resources committed 
t o many of the issues discussed here. Theory-based work has a ttributed many asso-
ciations, incentives, and efficiencies to disclosure. While there is extensive empirical 
work on associat ions and incentives, efficiency, as I define that term in the context 
of section 4, is less well studied. It would be of some interest to know the nature 
and type of efficiencies that exist in real institutional settings, and, if they d o ex-
ist, whether they have any economic significance. In other words, as t he theory of 
disclosure matures it seems reasonable to inquire whether t he empirical literature 
can provide additional insights into t he economic consequences of disclosure. These 
insights could be especially valuable if they were premised on the variety of issues 
See Levitt [1998, p. 81]. 
107 
discussed in these essays. 
For example, for all my enthusiasm for the information asymmetry component of 
the cost of capital as a start ing point for a comprehensive theory, I acknowledge the 
difficulty of ferreting it out in real market settings. Information asymmetry, like many 
of the economic consequences posited in t hese essays, is a "second-moment" effect 
(i.e., a var iance effect), and second-moment effects may be very secondary or tertiary 
in nature when compared against "first -moment" effects (i.e ., mean effects ). For ex -
ample, one would expect to be able to document that, as a first-moment effect, "good 
news" drives prices up and "bad news" drives prices down. T heory-based models , 
however, commonly characterize information asymmetry as a second-moment effect 
that is unrelat ed to means, or first moments . Information asymmet ry is commonly 
characterized this way because variables are posited to have a normal distribution, 
which implies two independent moments; obviously, for other (i.e ., non-normal) dis-
tributional forms, t here may be higher moments and all moments may b e related. 
The problem wit h second -moment effects is that they may be too subtle or obscure 
to manifest themselves in measurable ways. This is especially true when one uses 
data from firms publicly registered in the US b ecause under current US Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (US-GAAP), the disclosure environment is already 
r ich. In other words, commitments to increased (or reduced) levels of disclosure in 
the US may be primarily increm enta l, thereby leading to economic consequences that 
are difficult to document. One alternat ive is to suggest that researchers consider less 
developed capita l markets t han those found in the US. 
To conclude, one issue that deserves greater attention in t he accounting literat ure, 
both theory-based and empirical, is t he relation between disclosure and information 
asymmetry reduction. Among other t hings, this relation links disclosure t o efficiency, 
108 
and in t his sense prov ides an economic rat ionale for the utility of financial report ing . 
But while t he existing theory on t his topic is compelling, demonstrating the link 
empirically has proved elusive. This may mean t hat we need b ett er t heories; it may 
also mean that we need better empirical m ethodologies. It is probably t he case that 
we need a little more of bot h. 
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